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NOTES
SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY FOR GUESTS WHO DRINK AND
DRIVE: A CLOSER LOOK AT THE BENEFITS AND THE
BURDENS
In recent years, citizens have placed increasing pressure on
courts and legislatures to eliminate drunk driving.' While almost
every state legislature has responded by strengthening criminal
sanctions, 2 many state courts have reacted by expanding the scope
of civil liability for accidents caused by drunken driving.3 In addi-
tion to holding the intoxicated drivers liable,4 courts in many juris-
dictions have imposed civil liability on the tavern owners and bar-
tenders who served liquor to these drivers when the danger of
serving drinks was reasonably foreseeable. 5 Although these owners
and bartenders were not liable under common law, many recent
1. See, e.g., War on Alcohol Abuse Spreads to New Fronts, US. NEws & WORLD REP.,
Dec. 24, 1984, at 63 (noting the "citizens' revolt" from alliances between public officials,
police, distillers, bartenders, and "hundreds of thousands of angry, often bereaved citi-
zens"); Outrage over Drunk Driving, PEOPLE WEEKLY, July 25, 1983, at 18 (documenting the
heavy political pressure on state legislatures); see also South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S.
553, 558 (1983) (noting the history of Supreme Court rulings expressing dismay with the
scope of the drunk driving problem).
2. See War on Alcohol Abuse Spreads to New Fronts, supra note 1, at 63 ("Virtually
every state has toughened its drunk-driving laws in recent years-223 new statutes in all.");
Outrage over Drunk Driving, supra note 1, at 18 (noting that, since 1980, virtually every
state has strengthened its laws concerning drinking and driving); see also Kelly v. Gwinnell,
96 N.J. 538, 545, 476 A.2d 1219, 1222 (1984) (noting recent governmental responses to the
problem in New Jersey).
3. The majority of jurisdictions now have some form of legal rule imposing civil liability
on third persons who help cause alcohol-related accidents. See infra notes 6 & 19-20 and
accompanying text; see also War on Alcohol Abuse Spreads to New Fronts, supra note 1, at
63 (stating that, in thirty-six states, tavern owners can be liable for damages if they could
have taken steps to prevent a drinker from driving).
4. See Kraft, The Drive to Stop the Drinker from Driving: Suggested Civil Approaches,
59 N.D.L. Rsv. 391 (1983).
5. See infra note 6. See generally Comment, Liquor Vendor Liability for Torts of Intoxi-
cated Patrons, 12 U. BALT. L. l.Ev. 139 (1982) (discussing the accelerating development of
civil liability for tavern owners who sell liquor to individuals who become intoxicated and
drive).
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decisions have abrogated the common law rule of nonliability. The
common law doctrine now has become the minority rule.'
6. Courts in thirty-eight jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia, have decided to
abandon the common law rule of nonliability to some extent. See Marusa v. District of
Columbia, 484 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Corrigan v. United States, 609 F. Supp. 720 (E.D.
Va. 1985); Buchanan v. Merger Enters., Inc., 463 So. 2d 121 (Ala. 1984); Nazareno v. Urie,
638 P.2d 671 (Alaska 1981); Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 667 P.2d 200 (1983); Cantor
v. Anderson, 126 Cal. App. 3d 124, 178 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1981) (finding liability in limited
situations despite the general legislative abrogation of liability in CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714(b)-
(c) (West Supp. 1985) and CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602(b)-(c) (West Supp. 1985));
Kerby v. Flamingo Club, Inc., 35 Colo. App. 127, 532 P.2d 97.5 (1974); Davis v. Shiappacos-
see, 155 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1963); Ono v. Applegate, 62 Hawaii 131, 612 P.2d 533 (1980); Sutter
v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 327 S.E.2d 716 (1985); Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d
135 (1980); Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966); Haafke v. Mitchell, 347
N.W.2d 381 (Iowa 1984); Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1968); Chausse v. Southland
Corp., 400 So. 2d 1199 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Klingerman v. Sol Corp., 505 A.2d 474 (Me.
1986); Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968); Longstreth v.
Gensel, 423 Mich. 675, 377 N.W.2d 804 (1985); Trail v. Christian, 298 Minn. 101, 213
N.W.2d 618 (1973); Munford, Inc. v. Peterson, 368 So. 2d 213 (Miss. 1979); Nehring v.
LaCounte, - Mont. -, 712 P.2d 1329 (1986); Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d
900 (1965); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M.
625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982) (limited by N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-11-1 (Supp. 1985)); Berkeley v.
Park, 47 Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1965); Hutchens v. Hankins, 63 N.C. App. 1, 303
S.E.2d 584, review denied, 309 N.C. 191, 305 S.E.2d 734 (1983); Mason v. Roberts, 33 Ohio
St. 2d 29, 294 N.E.2d 884 (1973); Brigance v. The Velvet Dove Restaurant, Inc., No. 62,005,
slip. op. (Okla. July 8, 1986); Campbell v. Carpenter, 279 Or. 237, 566 P.2d 893 (1977) (lim-
ited by OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.955, .960 (1983)); Jardine v. Upper Darby Lounge No. 1973,
Inc., 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964); Christiansen v. Campbell, 285 S.C. 164, 328 S.E.2d
351 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985) (cert. denied); Walz v. City of Hudson, 327 N.W.2d 120 (S.D. 1982);
Mitchell v. Ketner, 54 Tenn. App. 656, 393 S.W.2d 755 (1964); No. 13-85-469-CV, slip op.
(Tex. Ct. App. June 30, 1986) (en banc); Langle v. Kurkul, No. 82-254, slip op. (Vt. Mar. 21,
1986) (dicta in plurality opinion); Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759, 458
P.2d 897 (1969) (following common law rule with limited exception); Sorensen v. Jarvis, 119
Wis. 2d 627, 350 N.W.2d 108 (1984); McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983).
Not all of the other thirteen jurisdictions adhere to the common law rule completely. Six
of these jurisdictions have dram shop statutes that impose liability in certain situations. See
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, 1 135, § 6-21 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.053(3) (Vernon Supp. 1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06
(Supp. 1985); R.I GEN. LAWS § 3-11-1 (Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-14-1 (Supp.
1985). In three of these six jurisdictions, courts have rejected liability beyond the relief pro-
vided by the statute, see Nelson v. Steffens, 170 Conn. 356, 365 A.2d 1174 (1976); Ruth v.
Benvenutti, 114 Ill. App. 3d 404, 449 N.E.2d 209 (1983); Thoring v. Bottansek, 350 N.W.2d
586 (N.D. 1984), while courts in two of the six jurisdictions, Rhode Island and Utah, have
not ruled on the matter. In the sixth jurisdiction, Missouri, the dram shop statute replaced
the common law liability imposed by the Missouri Court of Appeals in Carver v. Schaefer,
647 S.W.2d 570 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983), which the Missouri legislature expressly abrogated in
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.053(1)-(2) (Vernon Supp. 1986). In the remaining seven jurisdictions,
six courts have decided expressly not to abandon the common law rule, see Carr v. Turner,
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Recently, victims of alcohol-related accidents have argued that
courts also should extend this doctrine of liability to social hosts
who serve liquor gratuitously to guests who subsequently drive
while intoxicated. The courts, however, have been reluctant to ac-
cept this argument.7 Courts in only nine jurisdictions have recog-
nized social host liability.8 The effect of these decisions is tem-
pered somewhat by language in many of the opinions that restricts
liability to limited circumstances involving particularly wrongful
conduct.9 State legislatures in three of these nine jurisdictions ef-
fectively have overturned the decisions that imposed liability by
modifying their statutes either to eliminate liability or to limit lia-
bility to specific situations,0 leaving only six jurisdictions that cur-
rently impose liability.
238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656 (1965); Wright v. Moffitt, 437 A.2d 554 (Del. 1981); Ling v.
Jan's Liquors, 237 Kan. 629, 703 P.2d 731 (1985); Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 438 A.2d
494 (1981); Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb. 496, 244 N.W.2d 65 (1976); Hamm v. Carson City
Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358 (1969), while the courts in West Virginia have not
considered the issue.
7. See, e.g., Keckonen v. Robles, 146 Ariz. 268, 705 P.2d 945 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (review
denied); Bankston v. Brennan, 480 So. 2d 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Miller v. Moran, 96
Ill. App. 3d 596, 421 N.E.2d 1046 (1981); Holmquist v. Miller, 367 N.W.2d 468 (Minn. 1985);
Boutwell v. Sullivan, 469 So. 2d 526 (Miss. 1985); Harriman v. Smith, 697 S.W.2d 219 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1985); Paul v. Hogan, 56 A.D.2d 723, 392 N.Y.S.2d 766 (1977); Edgar v. Kajet, 84
Misc. 2d 100, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1975), aff'd, 55 A.D.2d 597, 389 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1976); Gar-
ren v. Cummings & McCurdy, Inc., No. 0727, slip op. (S.C. Ct. App. June 9, 1986).
8. See Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978);
Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 327 S.E.2d 716 (1985); Ashlock v. Norris, 475 N.E.2d 1167
(Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Clark v. Mincks, 364 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1985) (en banc); Longstreth v.
Gensel, 423 Mich. 675, 377 N.W.2d 804 (1985); Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 200 N.W.2d 149
(1972) (interpretation of dram shop statute); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219
(1984); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485
P.2d 18 (1971); Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259, 366 N.W.2d 857 (1985).
9. See, e.g., Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 559, 476 A.2d 1219, 1230 (1984) (liability lim-
ited "to the situation in which a host directly serves a guest"); Winslow v. Brown, 125 Wis.
2d 327, 333 n.2, 371 N.W.2d 417, 421 n.2 (1985) (stating that Wisconsin court's decision in
Koback v. Crook, establishing social host liability, was "limited to active negligence causing
the intoxication").
In addition, five of these decisions-Sutter, Longstreth, Ross, Wiener, and
Koback-involved minor guests rather than adult guests. Many of these five decisions in-
cluded express refusals to extend liability to hosts serving adult guests. See, e.g., Longstreth
v. Gensel, 423 Mich. 675, 685-86, 377 N.W.2d 804, 809 (1985); Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis. 2d
259, 277-78, 366 N.W.2d 857, 866 (1985) (Bablitch, J., concurring).
10. CAL. CIrv. CODE § 1714(b)-(c) (1985); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602(b)-(c) (West
Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1985); OR. Rav. STAT. §§ 30.955, .960
(1985). Courts in these jurisdictions have recognized the severe limiting effect that these
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Despite the negative response of state legislatures to the first
three judicial attempts to impose social host liability, the New
Jersey Supreme Court decided in 1984 to extend liability to a host
who had served a guest approximately thirteen drinks during a
short visit before letting the guest drive away.' Courts in Georgia,
Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, and Wisconsin quickly followed the New
Jersey court's lead, extending liability to social hosts whose con-
duct seemed less blameworthy than the conduct involved in the
New Jersey case.12 Courts in Arizona, Florida, Minnesota, Missis-
enactments have had on the courts' earlier decisions extending liability. See, e.g., Cory v.
Shierloh, 29 Cal. 3d 430, 629 P.2d 8, 174 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1981); Holmquist v. Miller, 367
N.W.2d 468 (Minn. 1985).
The Iowa legislature also repudiated an attempt by that state's supreme court to impose
social host liability based on a dram shop statute. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West
Supp. 1985) (amending IOWA CODE ANN. § 129.2 (West 1949) (effectively overruling Wil-
liams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972), in which the Iowa Supreme Court had
relied on section 129.2 to justify social host liability). The Iowa Supreme Court, however,
reimposed social host liability several years later based on negligence principles. Clark v.
Mincks, 364 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1985) (en banc). The dissenting judge in Clark argued unsuc-
cessfully that the court's action ignored the legislative intent underlying the amendment of
the old law. See id. at 232-33 (McGiverin, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
The recent extension of liability to New Jersey social hosts also may be in danger of
legislative abrogation. See Boutwell v. Sullivan, 469 So. 2d 526, 529 n.2 (Miss. 1985); Sulli-
van, Jersey Hosts Keeping Drunks from Driving, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1984, § 1, at 1, col. 2
(noting the introduction of a bill in the New Jersey legislature that would insulate social
hosts from liability); see also Special Project, Social Host Liability for the Negligent Acts of
Intoxicated Guests, 70 CORNEL L. REv. 1058, 1137-38 (describing three proposed bills that
would overturn, or at least limit, Kelly).
In New Mexico, the state legislature's response to a decision imposing civil liability on a
tavern owner left open the possibility of social host liability in limited situations:
No person who has gratuitously provided alcoholic beverages to a guest in a
social setting may be held liable in damages to any person for bodily injury,
death or property damage arising from the intoxication of the social guest un-
less the alcoholic beverages were provided recklessly in disregard of the rights
of others, including the social guest.
NM. STAT. ANN. § 41-11-1(E) (Supp. 1985) (passed in response to the decision of the New
Mexico Supreme Court in Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982)).
11. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 541, 476 A.2d 1219, 1220 (1984).
12. Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 327 S.E.2d 716 (1985) (providing keg at party during
which minor consumed equivalent of seven bottles of beer); Ashlock v. Norris, 475 N.E.2d
1167 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (purchase of two mixed drinks and three shots for an acquain-
tance); Clark v. Mincks, 364 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1985) (en bane) (providing beer to several
guests at a cookout, including one guest who allegedly consumed at least ten cupfuls); Long-
streth v. Gensel, 423 Mich. 675, 377 N.W.2d 804 (1985) (hosting wedding reception during
which minor drank "an unspecified amount" of alcoholic beverages); Koback v. Crook, 123
Wis. 2d 259, 366 N.W.2d 857 (1985) (furnishing beer to several minors at a party).
SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY
sippi, and Missouri, however, refused in 1985 to follow the New
Jersey court's lead.13 The sudden emergence of so many social host
liability decisions, as well as the continually mounting political
pressure to act against drunk driving,14 indicates that social host
liability will be an important and hotly contested issue in the next
few years.
This Note examines the wisdom of expanding liability to include
social hosts. After reviewing the evolution of the doctrine imposing
liability on tavern owners, the Note focuses on social hosts. It ex-
amines both specific legal arguments and general policy considera-
tions relevant to the social host liability issue, and contrasts these
legal arguments and policies with the considerations that
prompted courts to extend liability to tavern owners.
The Note concludes that a rule holding social hosts liable for
damages caused by the drunken driving of their guests is unwise.
Although a general extension of liability to social hosts might have
some impact on the problem of drunk driving, the extent of that
impact is highly speculative. In fact, the limited experience of
states that have experimented with social host liability indicates
that its effects are minimal. This minimal impact is significantly
outweighed by the risk of unjust results and the heavy burden that
potential liability places upon social hosts. General policy consider-
ations also weigh against imposition of liability. Instead of impos-
ing liability on social hosts, states should rely on measures that can
deal far more effectively with drunk driving and that do not have
the serious disadvantages associated with social host liability.
THEi DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL LIABILITY
Under common law, courts did not hold third persons liable for
injuries resulting from accidents caused by drunk drivers.15 Courts
justified this general rule of nonliability by suggesting that
13. Keckonen v. Robles, 146 Ariz. 268, 705 P.2d 945 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (review denied);
Bankston v. Brennan, 480 So. 2d 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Holmquist v. Miller, 367
N.W.2d 468 (Minn. 1985); Boutwell v. Sullivan, 469 So. 2d 526 (Miss. 1985); Harriman v.
Smith, 697 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
14. See supra note 1.
15. See, e.g., Megge v. United States, 344 F.2d 31 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 831
(1965); Ling v. Jan's Liquors, 237 Kan. 629, 703 P.2d 731 (1985); State v. Hatfield, 197 Md.
249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951).
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individuals should be responsible for their own tortsi" and that the
driver's drinking of liquor, not the tavern's selling of it, proxi-
mately caused any resulting injury.17 The sale of the liquor, accord-
ing to these courts, was too remote from the injury to be the proxi-
mate cause."8
Today, the common law rule of nonliability no longer applies in
most states to the owners and operators of drinking establish-
ments. Some state legislatures have overturned the rule by enact-
ing laws, usually known as "dram shop statutes" or "civil damage
acts," which expressly impose civil liability on tavern owners.' 9 In
addition, courts in most states have overruled the common law rule
and now hold tavern owners liable for accident damages caused by
their drunken patrons, based on traditional negligence principles.2s
Dram Shop Statutes
Many dram shop statutes include broad language easily capable
of application both to social hosts and to tavern owners.2' Most
courts, however, have read these statutes narrowly. These courts
have ruled that the legislatures intended the statutes to cover only
commercial dispensers, and not social hosts.22
16. Megge v. United States, 344 F.2d 31, 32 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 831 (1965);
State v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 254-55, 78 A.2d 754, 756-57 (1951).
17. Megge v. United States, 344 F.2d 31, 32 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 831 (1965);
Ling v. Jan's Liquors, 237 Kan. 629, 635, 703 P.2d 731, 735-36 (1985); State v. Hatfield, 197
Md. 249, 254-55, 78 A.2d 754, 756-57 (1951).
18. State v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 255, 78 A.2d 754, 757 (1951).
19. Fourteen states currently have dram shop statutes. See Ling v. Jan's Liquors, 237
Kan. 629, 635, 703 P.2d 731, 736 (1985); Special Project, supra note 10, at 1067-69; Note,
Social Host Liability for Injuries Caused by the Acts of an Intoxicated Guest, 59 N.D.L.
REv. 445, 446 n.10 (1983). For discussions of the history of dram shop statutes, and of their
adoption and repeal in many states, see Special Project, supra note 10, at 1065-67; Note,
supra, at 448-51.
20. Courts in thirty-seven jurisdictions have abrogated the common law rule of nonliabil-
ity with respect to tavern owners. See supra note 6.
21. See Special Project, supra note 10, at 1067-68 (noting ten such broadly worded stat-
utes); see, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, 135, § 6-21 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986) ("Every person
who is injured in person or property by any intoxicated person, has a right of action in his
or her own name, severally or jointly, against any person who by selling or giving alcoholic
liquor, causes the intoxication of such person.").
22. See, e.g., Cruse v. Aden, 127 IM. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889); Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass
Co., 48 Ill. App. 2d 412, 199 N.E.2d 300 (1964); Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 375
N.Y.S.2d 548 (1975), affd, 55 A.D.2d 597, 389 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1976).
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Despite this trend, courts in two jurisdictions came to the oppo-
site conclusion, temporarily extending the coverage of dram shop
statutes to social hosts.23 In Ross v. Ross,2' the Minnesota Supreme
Court considered a statute that extended civil liability to "any per-
son who, by illegally selling, bartering, or giving intoxicating i-
quors, caused the intoxication" of the person who injured the
plaintiff.25 The court held that this law applied to an individual
who had purchased liquor for his younger brother.26 In Williams v.
Klemesrud,27 the Iowa Supreme Court similarly interpreted a
dram shop statute to apply to an individual who was not a tavern
owner. The court read the statute's reference to "any person who
shall, by selling or giving to another contrary to the provisions of
this title, any intoxicating liquors ' 28 as including an individual who
had supplied a bottle of vodka to a minor.29
Neither decision, however, resulted in a permanent extension of
civil liability to social hosts. Both state legislatures quickly
amended their statutes, deleting references to "giving" liquor.
Through these amendments, both legislatures clarified their intent
to hold only commercial dispensers, and not private social hosts,
civilly liable under these laws.30
The importance of dram shop statutes has declined in recent
years, not only because of the tendency toward narrow interpreta-
tion illustrated by the court decisions and by the actions of the
Iowa and Minnesota legislatures, but also because of the repeal of
23. Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972); Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 200
N.W.2d 149 (1972).
24. 294 Minn. 115, 200 N.W.2d 149 (1972).
25. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West 1972).
26. 294 Minn. at 121-22, 200 N.W.2d at 152-53. The younger brother had become intoxi-
cated, had driven, and had been killed in the resulting accident. Id. at 116, 200 N.W.2d at
150.
27. 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972).
28. IOWA CODE ANN. § 129.2 (West 1949).
29. 197 N.W.2d at 615. The minor had become drunk and had caused an automobile acci-
dent that seriously had injured the other driver. Id.
30. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West Supp. 1985) (amending IOWA CODE ANN. § 129.2
(West 1949) by limiting application of the statute to licensees and permittees); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1985) (amending MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West 1972) by
eliminating the word "giving"). In Iowa, however, the court later extended liability to social
hosts based on common law negligence principles. Clark v. Mincks, 364 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa
1985) (en banc); see supra note 10.
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dram shop statutes in many states.3' Court decisions based on
judicially-created negligence principles have been far more signifi-
cant in the development of tavern owner liability. Because legisla-
tures have resisted the extension of civil liability to third parties, 2
these judicially-created principles probably will continue to be the
primary avenue for imposition of social host liability.
Negligence Theory
Courts in most jurisdictions have abrogated the common law
rule of nonliability, at least to a limited extent, by applying tradi-
tional negligence principles.33 These courts have based their deci-
sions on two primary rationales. Some courts have relied on tavern
owners' violations of criminal statutes either to provide evidence of
negligence or to establish negligence per se.3 4 Other courts have
justified liability under general negligence principles by emphasiz-
ing the tavern owners' ability to foresee danger to the motoring
public.s5
31. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2150 (1923) (repealed by KAN. STAT. ANN. § 41-1106
(1949)) (history discussed in Ling v. Jan's Liquors, 237 Kan. 629, 636-39, 703 P.2d 731, 736-
38 (1985)); 1879 Mass. Acts ch. 297, § 1 (amended by 1880 Mass. Acts ch. 239, § 4, and ch.
256, § 1, and repealed by 1933 Mass. Acts ch. 376, § 2) (history discussed in Adamian v.
Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 493, 500, 233 N.E.2d 18, 19 (1968)); NEB. COMP. STAT. § 53-147
(1929) (repealed by 1935 Neb. Laws ch. 116) (history discussed in Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb.
496, 498-99, 244 N.W.2d 65, 67 (1976)); 1921 N.J. Laws ch. 103, p. 184 (amended by 1922
N.J. Laws ch. 257, p. 628, and repealed by 1934 N.J. Laws ch. 32, p. 104) (history discussed
in Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 200-01, 156 A.2d 1, 8 (1959)); WASH. REv. CODE
§ 4.24.100 (1950) (repealed by 1955 Wash. Laws ch. 372, § 1) (history discussed in Wilson v.
Steinbach, 98 Wash. 2d 434, 437 & n.1, 656 P.2d 1030, 1032 & n.1 (1982) (en banc)). For
discussions of the history of dram shop statutes and their adoption and repeal in many
states, see Special Project, supra note 10, at 1065-67; Note, supra note 19, at 448-51.
32. See supra note 10.
33. See supra note 6. The decision to apply negligence principles has not been limited to
states without dram shop legislation. See, e.g., Berkeley v. Park, 47 Misc. 2d 381, 262
N.Y.S.2d 290 (1965). But see Holmquist v. Miller, 367 N.W.2d 468, 471 (Minn. 1985) (dram
shop statute provides exclusive remedy and preempts any action based on negligence
principles).
34. See, e.g., Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
35. See, e.g., Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 201-03, 156 A.2d 1, 8-9 (1959).
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Negligence Based on Violations of Criminal Statutes
Development of Tavern Owner Liability
Every state has a body of law regulating the service of alcoholic
beverages, usually imposing criminal sanctions on individuals who
supply liquor to minors or to obviously intoxicated persons.3 6
These statutes usually are broad enough to apply to situations in
which drunken drivers have caused accidents. 1 As a result, many
plaintiffs looking to recover from tavern owners or social hosts
have argued that the criminal violations committed by these par-
ties in supplying the liquor constitute actionable negligence. These
plaintiffs have contended either that these criminal violations are
negligence per se or that they are evidence of negligence.3 s
Originally, courts uniformly rejected these arguments, holding
that the legislatures did not create these criminal statutes to pro-
tect potential accident victims or to create private rights of action.
Instead, the courts determined that the legislatures intended pri-
marily to protect minors, intoxicated persons, and others specifi-
cally mentioned in the statutes.3 " In 1959, however, the New Jersey
Supreme Court accepted a plaintiff's negligence arguments in the
landmark case of Rappaport v. Nichols. 40
36. For a complete listing of the applicable criminal statutes in the fifty states, see Spe-
cial Project, supra note 10, at 1076 n.135.
37. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25658(a) (West Supp. 1985) ("Every person who
sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away, any alcoholic beverage
to any person under the age of 21 years is guilty of a misdemeanor."); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 125.07(2) (West Supp. 1985) ("No person may procure for, sell, dispense, or give away
alcoholic beverages to a person who is intoxicated.").
38. Courts disagree concerning the effect of statutory violations on the existence of negli-
gence. Some courts hold that any time the legislature intended a statute to protect a partic-
ular class, a violation of the statute constitutes negligence per se as to members of that class
and harms that the legislature intended to prevent. See, e.g., Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y.
164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920). Other courts hold that such a statutory violation creates a rebutta-
ble presumption of negligence. See, e.g., Shulins v. New England Ins. Co., 360 F.2d 781 (2d
Cir. 1966). A few other courts hold that statutory violations may be considered only as evi-
dence of negligence. See, e.g., Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 203, 156 A.2d 1, 9 (1959).
39. See, e.g., Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App. 2d 803, 143 P.2d 952 (1943) (disapproved in
Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 CaL Rptr. 623 (1971)). In some jurisdictions
with dram shop statutes, courts have justified these holdings by finding that the legislature
intended to create an exclusive remedy when it passed a dram shop act. See Knierim v. Izzo,
2 l. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961); Holmquist v. Miller, 367 N.W.2d 468 (Minn. 1985).
40. 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959). In another case decided earlier that year, a federal
court also accepted an argument that a criminal violation constituted negligence per se.
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In Rappaport, an older friend had accompanied a minor to sev-
eral public bars, where he had purchased alcoholic drinks for the
minor. The minor had become intoxicated and, while driving
home, had collided with another vehicle. The driver of the other
vehicle had died in the collision. In the wrongful death suit that
followed, the decedent's estate named as codefendants the minor,
the older friend, and the bar owner.41
The court abandoned the common law rule of nonliability, refus-
ing to find, as a matter of law, that the bar owner's negligent con-
duct of serving a minor was not the proximate cause of the auto-
mobile accident and the death.42 The court reasoned that the
legislature could not have intended the broadly worded applicable
criminal statute43 to protect only minors and intoxicated persons.
The legislature, according to the court, also must have intended
this statute to protect the general public.4 4 Because of this per-
ceived legislative intent, the court deemed any violation of the ap-
plicable criminal statute admissible evidence of negligence in a
civil suit.45 Although New Jersey had repealed its dram shop stat-
ute in 1934,46 the court did not interpret that repeal as a legislative
attempt to eliminate a private remedy. Instead, the court viewed
the legislative intent underlying the passage of the criminal statute
as distinct from the intent underlying the dram shop legislation.
4 7
Since Rappaport, many courts have followed New Jersey's lead.
These courts either have followed the reasoning in Rappaport that
a tavern owner's criminal violations could be submitted to a jury as
evidence of negligence, 8 or have held that such criminal violations
Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S.
903 (1960).
41. 31 N.J. at 192-93, 156 A.2d at 3.
42. Id. at 204, 156 A.2d at 9.
43. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-77 (West 1940) (cited in Rappaport, 31 N.J. at 201, 156 A.2d at
8).
44. 31 N.J. at 201-02, 156 A.2d at 8.
45. Id. at 203, 156 A.2d at 9.
46. See supra note 31.
47. 31 N.J. at 201, 156 A.2d at 8.
48. E.g., Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 493, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968); Ramsey v.
Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965); McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo.
1983).
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constitute negligence per se.49 Extension of these theories to social
hosts, however, has been slow.
Application to Social Hosts
Thirteen years after Rappaport, California became the first state
to extend these doctrines of liability to a social host. In Brockett v.
Kitchen Boyd Motor Co.,50 several plaintiffs sued an employer51 for
serving liquor to a minor employee who later had injured the
plaintiffs in an automobile accident.5 2 In its initial consideration of
Brockett, the California Court of Appeal applied the traditional
nonliability rule, stating that the rule was "unquestionably estab-
lished" in California law. 3 In 1971, however, the California Su-
preme Court overturned the common law rule of nonliability in a
case involving a tavern owner who had served a minor.5 The Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal then reheard Brockett, and held that the
employer's violation of a California statute forbidding the service
of alcohol to minors constituted actionable negligence.5 5 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court later extended the doctrine to situations in-
volving service to adult guests."
The extension of liability to California social hosts, however, was
short-lived. When the California legislature amended its Civil Code
in 1978, it severely limited the scope of Brockett and subsequent
49. E.g., Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. de-
nied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960); Thaut v. Finley, 50 Mich. App. 611, 213 N.W.2d 820 (1973).
50. 264 Cal. App. 2d 69, 70 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1968), rev'd on reh'g, 24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 100
Cal. Rptr. 752 (1972).
51. Cases involving employers as defendants raise different issues than cases involving
other types of social hosts. The differences are so great that some courts view employer
liability as a totally distinct area of law. In Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307 (Tex.
1983), for example, the Texas Supreme Court stated:
[The employer] says that by imposing liability for the acts of its intoxicated
employee, [who got drunk at a company Christmas party,] this Court would be
judicially creating "dram shop" liability. We disagree. This is not a "dram
shop" case. If a duty is to be imposed... it... would be based on additional
factors.
Id. at 309.
52. 264 Cal. App. 2d at 70, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
53. Id. at 71, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
54. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
55. 24 Cal. App. 3d at 93, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
56. See, e.g., Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534
(1978); infra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
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social host liability decisions. The amended statute specifically dis-
approved of the holdings in several social host cases," and ex-
pressly stated the legislature's intent "to reinstate the prior judi-
cial interpretation of this section.
58
Until 1985, California remained the only jurisdiction in which
the highest state court had attempted to impose social host liabil-
ity based on statutory violations e.5  The vast majority of courts had
rejected statutorily-based liability,60 reasoning that the legislatures
had intended to limit application of these statutes to commercial
sellers.6 1 Any extension of liability beyond commercial sellers, ac-
cording to these courts, should come from the legislatures, not
LL * 62from the judiciary.
In 1985, however, a number of statutorily-based decisions
emerged. 3 In Clark v. Mincks,64 for example, the Iowa Supreme
57. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1714(b) (1985) (mentioning Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d
144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978), Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546
P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976), and Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 623 (1971)).
58. CA. CiV. CODE § 1714(b) (1985); see CAL. CiV. CODE § 1714(c) (1985); CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 25602(b)-(c) (West Supp. 1985). The California courts generally have ruled
that these new statutes preclude most actions against social hosts. See Cory v. Shierloh, 29
Cal. 3d 430, 629 P.2d 8, 174 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1981). But see Cantor v. Anderson, 126 Cal.
App. 3d 124, 178 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1981) (holding that an action against a social host was not
foreclosed by the new statutes in a special situation in which a host served an individual
who he knew was developmentally disabled).
59. A few lower state courts had imposed liability on social hosts who furnished alcoholic
beverages to minor guests, based on statutory violations. See, e.g., Brattain v. Herron, 159
Ind. App. 663, 309 N.E.2d 150 (1974); Thaut v. Finley, 50 Mich. App. 611, 213 N.W.2d 820
(1973); Lover v. Sampson, 44 Mich. App. 173, 205 N.W.2d 69 (1972). The handful of state
supreme courts that had imposed social host liability before 1985, however, had rested their
decisions on general negligence principles, although some of these courts had mentioned
statutory violations in passing. See, e.g., Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219
(1984) (mentioning applicable criminal sanctions, but imposing liability based on general
negligence principles and policy considerations).
60. See, e.g., Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1975), af'd, 55 A.D.2d
597, 389 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1976); Manning v. Andy, 454 Pa. 237, 310 A.2d 75 (1973) (per
curiam).
61. See, e.g., Manning v. Andy, 454 Pa. 237, 240-42, 310 A.2d 75, 76-77 (1973) (Pomeroy,
J., concurring).
62. See, e.g., id. at 239, 310 A.2d at 76 (per curiam).
63. Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 327 S.E.2d 716 (1985); Ashlock v. Norris, 475 N.E.2d
1167 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Clark v. Mincks, 364 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1985) (en banc); Long-
streth v. Gensel, 423 Mich. 675, 377 N.W.2d 804 (1985); Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259,
366 N.W.2d 857 (1985).
64. 364 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1985) (en banc).
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Court relied principally on the violation of a criminal statute to
impose social host liability. In Clark, William and Larry Mincks
had hosted a cookout that was attended by several guests, includ-
ing Robert Mincks, his wife Nancy, Michael Clark, his wife Shirley,
and the Clark's daughter Michelle. Nancy Mincks had begun
drinking before the cookout, and had continued drinking large
quantities of beer at the cookout. Although she was obviously
drunk, and she had spilled beer on one of the hosts, Nancy had
driven away from the cookout in a van with several passengers,
including Michelle Clark. The van had flipped over and rolled sev-
eral times, killing both Nancy and Michelle.6 5
The trial court had dismissed the wrongful death action filed by
Michelle's parents, ruling that no cause of action lies against a so-
cial host for injuries arising when the host gives intoxicants to a
guest.6 The Iowa Supreme Court reversed,67 basing its decision on
the hosts' violation of an Iowa statute that provides: "[N]o person
shall sell, dispense, or give to any intoxicated person, or one simu-
lating intoxication, any alcoholic liquor or beer."6 8 The court noted
that it had relied in two previous cases on similar statutory viola-
tions to hold liquor store owners liable for damages stemming from
their acts 9.6 Because the broad statutory language applied just as
clearly to social hosts, the court also allowed recovery against the
hosts in Clark.70
Almost simultaneously, the Georgia Supreme Court decided to
rely partially on the violation of a criminal statute to justify its
extension of civil liability to social hosts in Sutter v. Hutchings.7 1
In that case, a mother and her teenage daughter had held a party
for the daughter's high school classmates. The refreshments had
included a keg of beer. At the party, the mother had observed an
65. Id. at 227-28.
66. See id.
67. Id. at 232.
68. IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.49(1) (West 1983) (cited in Clark, 364 N.W.2d at 228).
69. Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1977) (cited in Clark, 364 N.W.2d at 229);
Haafke v. Mitchell, 347 N.W.2d 381 (Iowa 1984) (cited in Clark, 364 N.W.2d at 229).
70. 364 N.W.2d at 231. The court also noted the general policy considerations that the
New Jersey Supreme Court had advanced to justify its extension of social host liability,
based on general negligence principles, in Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219
(1984). 364 N.W.2d at 230.
71. 254 Ga. 194, 327 S.E.2d 716 (1985).
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underage guest drinking heavily and later had watched him get
into his car. She had allowed him to drive despite her expressed
concerns about his intoxicated condition. A few minutes later, the
drunk driver had sped through a red light and had killed the plain-
tiff's husband, David Sutter.7 2
The Georgia Supreme Court reversed a decision in which the
Georgia Court of Appeals had dismissed the widow's wrongful
death action against the mother and her daughter. 3 The supreme
court supported its conclusion that social hosts have a duty not to
serve liquor to visibly intoxicated or underage guests by noting the
hostesses' violation of Georgia statutes that forbid the furnishing
of alcohol to visibly intoxicated persons and to persons under the
age of nineteen. 4 The court found that the Georgia legislature had
passed these statutes to protect not only intoxicated and underage
individuals, but also motorists on the highways. Based on this in-
terpretation, the court reasoned that a host's duty under the stat-
utes extends to third parties.7 5 The defendants argued that the
duty should not extend beyond commercial establishments because
social hosts do not have bouncers to prevent drunken guests from
driving. The court rejected that argument, reasoning that the
host's duty arises before a guest becomes so visibly intoxicated
that a bouncer is necessary. According to the court, the host's duty
is to stop serving alcohol to a noticeably intoxicated guest.7
16
Once the court had established this duty, its next task was to
determine whether the defendants' breach of the duty proximately
caused the plaintiff's injury. The court concluded that it had, be-
cause the risk in this case had been foreseeable to the defendants. 7
72. Id. at 194, 327 S.E.2d at 716-17.
73. Id. at 199, 327 S.E.2d at 720.
74. Id. at 197, 327 S.E.2d at 718-19. The two statutes that the court cited in Sutter were
GA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-22 (1982) ("No alcoholic beverage shall be sold... given, provided, or
furnished to any person who is in a state of noticeable intoxication."), and GA. CODE ANN.
§ 3-3-23(a)(1) (Supp. 1985) ("No person knowingly, by himself or through another, shall
furnish [or] cause to be furnished ... any alcoholic beverage to any person under 19 years
of age" except for medical or religious purposes, or in the home with parental consent.).
75. 254 Ga. at 197, 327 S.E.2d at 719.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 198, 327 S.E.2d at 719.
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The court, therefore, approved the cause of action against the so-
cial host.78
In Ashlock v. Norris,79 the Indiana Court of Appeals became the
third court in fifteen days to announce a decision imposing social
host liability using a statutory theory. In Ashlock, the defendant
had purchased several drinks for an acquaintance, Cindy Morrow.
After several hours of drinking, the defendant and Morrow had left
the bar. Although Morrow had stumbled and fallen as she had left,
the defendant had helped her into her car after failing in an at-
tempt to persuade her not to drive. About a mile from the bar, the
Morrow's car had strayed ten feet off the road and had struck and
killed Anthony Ashlock, who had been jogging. Morrow had con-
tinued driving for two miles before ending up in a ditch. 0
The administratrix of Ashlock's estate, suing for wrongful death,
argued that the defendant's actions had violated an Indiana crimi-
nal statute that forbids anyone from furnishing alcoholic beverages
to another person with knowledge "that the other person is intoxi-
cated."81 This criminal violation, the plaintiff argued, also consti-
tuted the breach of a civil duty owed to Cindy Morrow. 2 The court
agreed, citing several cases in which similar violations had justified
liability.8 3 Although most of these cases had involved tavern own-
ers and bartenders, 84 the court reasoned that "the legislature has
chosen to draw no distinction between one who sells in violation of
the statute and one who gives or furnishes in violation." '85 Accord-
ingly, the court extended liability to the host in Ashlock.86
78. Id. at 199, 327 S.E.2d at 720.
79. 475 N.E.2d 1167 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
80. Id. at 1168.
81. IND. CODE § 7.1-5-10-15(a) (1985) (cited in Ashlock, 475 N.E.2d at 1168).
82. 475 N.E.2d at 1168.
83. Id. at 1169 (citing Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966), Brattain v.
Herron, 159 Ind. App. 663, 309 N.E.2d 150 (1974), and three other cases).
84. See id. The only exception was Brattain v. Herron, 159 Ind. App. 663, 309 N.E.2d 150
(1974), but that case was distinguishable because it involved the furnishing of alcohol to a
minor rather than to an adult. See supra note 59.
85. 475 N.E.2d at 1169.
86. Id. A judge from another district of the Indiana Court of Appeals, in rejecting an
attempt to impose liability on a college and a fraternity for injuries from an alcohol-related
accident following a fraternity party, criticized the result in Ashlock as "troublesome" and
as raising "serious legal and practical problems." Campbell v. Board of Trustees, No. 06A01-
8601-CV-1, slip op. at - (ind. Ct. App. July 16, 1986).
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Only a month after Clark, Sutter, and Ashlock were decided, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin extended liability to social hosts,
based on the same theory, in Koback v. Crook.87 In Koback, two
seventeen-year-old students, Leslie Koback and Michael Crook,
had attended a graduation party hosted by the parents of a fellow
student. The hosts had served beer to Crook, who had become in-
toxicated, and had left the party on his motorcycle with Koback as
a passenger. Shortly thereafter, Crook's motorcycle had struck a
parked car. Leslie Koback had been thrown to the pavement, and
she had suffered severe injuries.88
The Wisconsin court noted that less than one year earlier, in
Sorensen v. Jarvis,8" it had overruled several earlier decisions in
which it had followed the common law rule of nonliability.90 In
Sorensen, the court had imposed liability on a commercial vendor
for selling liquor to a minor. The sale had been a statutory viola-
tion which, according to the court, had constituted negligence per
se.
91
In Koback, the Wisconsin court found the facts indistinguishable
from Sorensen, despite the involvement of a social host rather
than a commercial establishment.92 The court held that the same
negligence per se principles applied because the same statutes had
been violated. The fact that a social host rather than a commercial
vendor had violated the statutes made no difference, the court rea-
soned, because the statutes applied equally to both.93 The court
rejected arguments that social hosts and commercial vendors could
be distinguished based on the blameworthiness of their conduct,
the nature of their relationship with the person drinking the alco-
hol, their ability to spread the costs of liability, and the remoteness
of their conduct from the injury.9 4 The court concluded that
87. 123 Wis. 2d 259, 366 N.W.2d 857 (1985).
88. Id. at 262, 366 N.W.2d at 858.
89. 119 Wis. 2d 627, 350 N.W.2d 108 (1984).
90. Olsen v. Copeland, 90 Wis. 2d 483, 280 N.W.2d 178 (1979); Garcia v. Hargrove, 52
Wis. 2d 289, 190 N.W.2d 181 (1971); Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 176 N.W.2d 566
(1970).
91. 119 Wis. 2d at 645, 350 N.W.2d at 117.
92. 123 Wis. 2d at 269, 274, 366 N.W.2d at 862, 864.
93. Id. at 266, 366 N.W.2d at 860.
94. Id. at 267-70, 366 N.W.2d at 861-62. The court also dismissed several policy-oriented
arguments, including contentions that social host liability would dilute the responsibility of
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liability should attach, based on the hosts' violation of the statutes
forbidding service of alcohol to minors. 5
Seven months after the decision in Koback, the Michigan Su-
preme Court decided Longstreth v. Gensel,8 becoming the fifth
state court to adopt a social host liability rule during 1985. Long-
streth involved a wedding reception during which a nineteen-year-
old guest had consumed "an unspecified amount" of liquor. The
youth subsequently had died in an automobile accident.9 7 The par-
ents sued the hosts of the reception for their son's death, claiming
that the hosts' violation of a Michigan statute forbidding the ser-
vice of alcohol to minors was negligence that had proximately
caused the death.98
The trial court had granted the hosts' motion for summary judg-
ment, but the Michigan Court of Appeals had reversed.9 The
Michigan Supreme Court upheld the court of appeals, agreeing
with that court's conclusion that the Michigan legislature had
passed the statute not only to regulate licensees, but also "to exer-
cise complete control of the alcoholic beverage traffic within th[e]
state." 100 Because the plaintiffs fell within the class that the stat-
ute was intended to protect, according to the court, they could
maintain an action based on the hosts' violation of the statute.101
Noting that Michigan law views violations of criminal statutes as
prima facie evidence of negligence, and not as dispositive evi-
dence, 10 2 the court affirmed the court of appeals' decision to re-
mand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.10 3
The decisions in Clark, Sutter, Ashlock, Koback, and Long-
streth, coming so close together, seemed to indicate a rapidly esca-
the drunk driver to the victim, that it would encourage fraudulent claims, and that it would
destroy the atmosphere at social events. Id. at 271-76, 366 N.W.2d at 863-65.
95. Id. at 276-77, 366 N.W.2d at 865. The court reserved judgment concerning whether
the service of alcohol to an adult guest could support a similar action based on negligence
per se. See id. at 277-78, 366 N.W.2d at 866 (Bablitch, J., concurring).
96. 423 Mich. 675, 377 N.W.2d 804 (1985).
97. Id. at 678, 377 N.W.2d at 806.
98. Id. at 678-79, 377 N.W.2d at 806 (citing MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 436.33 (West 1978
& Supp. 1985)).
99. See id. at 679-80, 377 N.W.2d at 806.
100. Id. at 683, 377 N.W.2d at 808 (emphasis by the court).
101. Id. at 693, 377 N.W.2d at 812-13.
102. See id. at 692, 377 N.W.2d at 812.
103. Id. at 698-99, 377 N.W.2d at 815.
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lating trend toward imposition of social host liability based on
statutory violations. Just nine days after Koback was decided,
however, the Mississippi Supreme Court became the first of three
courts in 1985 to reject the same theory expressly.'04 In Boutwell v.
Sullivan,'°5 several hosts allegedly had given large quantities of
beer to a guest after the guest had become visibly intoxicated.
About an hour and a quarter after the guest had left the host's
home, his car had struck and killed a motorcycle rider. The rider's
widow had sued for herself and for her children.106
The plaintiffs argued that the hosts had been negligent per se
because they allegedly had violated a Mississippi criminal statute
that forbids the furnishing of alcoholic beverages to "any person
who is visibly intoxicated.' 10 7 The court rejected the plaintiffs' ar-
gument, ruling that the host had not violated the statute because
the statute did not apply to the hosts' conduct. 0 8 Even if the
plaintiffs had succeeded in showing a statutory violation, however,
the multiple policy arguments the court advanced in rejecting the
plaintiffs' general negligence theory'09 indicate that the statutory
argument still would have failed.
The Missouri Court of Appeals more squarely rejected a statuto-
rily-based argument in Harriman v. Smith.10 In that case, the
plaintiff alleged that three hosts had served alcoholic beverages to
an underage guest, and had continued to serve the guest after he
had become obviously intoxicated. The plaintiff's son, while riding
104. Boutwell v. Sullivan, 469 So. 2d 526 (Miss. 1985); see Bankston v. Brennan, 480 So.
2d 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Harriman v. Smith, 697 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
Two other courts that rejected social host liability at approximately the same time ad-
dressed only general negligence principles, and not arguments based on statutory violations.
See Keckonen v. Robles, 146 Ariz. 268, 705 P.2d 945 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (review denied);
Holmquist v. Miller, 367 N.W.2d 468 (Minn. 1985).
105. 469 So. 2d 526 (Miss. 1985).
106. Id. at 527.
107. Id. (citing Miss. CODE ANN. § 67-1-83(1) (1972)).
108. The statutory definition of "alcoholic beverage" did not include the beer served to
the guest. See id. at 528 (citing Miss. CODE ANN. § 67-1-5 (Supp. 1984)).
109. For example, the court noted the difficulties a social host would encounter in at-
tempting to control his guest and the desire for legislative, rather than judicial, resolution of
the question. See id. at 529; infra notes 265-70 and accompanying text.
110. 697 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
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in the guest's car after they had left the hosts' house, had died in
an automobile accident.111
The plaintiff in Harriman based his negligence per se argument
on the hosts' violation of a Missouri statute that forbids the sup-
plying of intoxicating liquor to minors or intoxicated persons.1 2
Although the court acknowledged that individuals had been held
liable under the statute,15 it asserted that "the obvious intent of
the legislature is the control of liquor licensees.1' 14 Based on this
perceived lack of intent to control the conduct of social hosts, the
court rejected the plaintiff's statutory argument.115
Clark, Sutter, Ashlock, Koback, and Longstreth demonstrate
the popularity of the statutory theory among courts inclined to ac-
cept social host liability. Boutwell and Harriman, however, illus-
trate that some courts still have trouble accepting these argu-
ments. The following section illustrates that alternative theories of
social host liability, based on general negligence principles, have
encountered even more resistance in recent decisions.
Negligence Based on Common Law Principles
Development of Tavern Owner Liability
The New Jersey Supreme Court was the first court to extend
civil liability to tavern owners based on traditional negligence prin-
ciples. Its extension of liability came in Rappaport v. Nichols,"
which still is considered the leading case, just as it is in the area of
statutorily-based liability.11 7 Before Rappaport, courts had held
111. Id. at 220.
112. Id. at 222-23 (quoting Mo. REv. STAT. § 311.310 (1978)).
113. Id. at 223 (citing State v. Patton, 336 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960)).
114. Id.
115. Id. The plaintiff's first contention, which stated that the hosts should be liable under
common law negligence principles, also failed. See id. at 220-22.
The Florida District Court of Appeal also rejected a statutorily-based social host liability
argument in 1985, based on its interpretation of precedent from the Florida Supreme Court.
Bankston v. Brennan, 480 So. 2d 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). The court of appeal, how-
ever, certified the question to the supreme court for a definitive resolution. See id. at 248.
Most recently, the South Carolina Court of Appeals rejected an attempt to impose liabil-
ity based both on statutory violations and on common law principles. Garren v. Cummings
& McCurdy, Inc., No. 0727, slip op. (S.C. Ct. App. June 9, 1986).
116. 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
117. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
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uniformly that sales of liquor to minors or intoxicated adults could
not form the basis of a tort action. Courts had justified these hold-
ings by stating that individuals are responsible for their own torts
and that, because the sale of the liquor was so remote from the
injury, only the consumption of the liquor could be considered the
proximate cause.118 In Rappaport, however, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court flatly rejected this argument and imposed a duty of
care on tavern operators.
The court in Rappaport focused its attention on the frequency
of alcohol-related accidents on the nation's highways. The court
reasoned that, given public awareness of the problem, reasonable
tavern owners and bartenders could foresee the danger that re-
sulted from their liquor sales.1 9 Because the danger was great, not
only for the minor or the drunk but also for the traveling public,
the court suggested that a reasonably prudent tavern operator
would act to avoid the danger. 120 As a result, the court reasoned
that the jury should be permitted to consider the tavern owner's
failure to act in Rappaport as evidence of possible negligence. If
the jury concluded that the owner had been negligent, according to
the court, the jury also would have to determine whether the in-
jury had resulted from the ordinary, foreseeable course of events
stemming from the owner's negligence before it could impose
liability.' 2'
Rappaport ignited a trend toward tavern owner liability based
on negligence principles. Although the trend was slow at first, it
has accelerated in the past ten years. Today, tavern owner liability
is imposed in the vast majority of states. 22
Application to Social Hosts
All of the observations used in Rappaport and subsequent cases
to justify tavern owner liability arguably apply with equal force to
social hosts. Even in jurisdictions where tavern owners have been
subject to liability for many years, however, courts have been
118. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
119. 31 N.J. at 201, 156 A.2d at 8.
120. Id. at 203-04, 156 A.2d at 8-9.
121. Id. at 203-04, 156 A.2d at 9.
122. See supra note 6.
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reluctant to extend the analysis to social hosts. 123 Prior to 1984,
only two courts had applied the traditional negligence analysis to
social hosts.12 4 Neither court was able to create a long-standing so-
cial host liability rule, because both state legislatures subsequently
passed laws overruling these decisions. 25
In 1971, in Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega
Fraternity,128 the Oregon Supreme Court reversed a summary
judgment in favor of a social host in an action grounded on a negli-
gence theory. In Wiener, a college fraternity had served liquor to a
minor. On the way back to campus, the minor had become in-
volved in an automobile accident in which his passengers were in-
jured.127 In considering the passengers' suit against the fraternity,
the supreme court reasoned that a social host may have a duty in
certain circumstances to restrict a guest's further access to alco-
holic beverages. This duty is particularly likely to arise, the court
explained, when the host "'has reason to know that he is dealing
with persons whose characteristics make it especially likely that
they will do unreasonable things.' ,,12s According to the court, the
circumstances giving rise to the duty almost certainly will occur
when a host's guests are already severely intoxicated or are known
to the host as unusually susceptible to the effect of alcohol. The
court added that, in some circumstances, the duty also may arise
with respect to guests who are minors. 12 9 Because the guest in Wie-
ner was a minor, the court held that summary judgment for the
fraternity was inappropriate, and that the jury had to determine,
under the particular circumstances of the social function, whether
the host had a duty to restrict guests' access to alcohol.13 0
123. See, e.g., Miller v. Moran, 96 Ill. App. 3d 596, 421 N.E.2d 1046 (1981); Paul v. Ho-
gan, 56 A.D.2d 723, 392 N.Y.S.2d 766 (1977); Klein v. Raysinger, 504 Pa. 141, 470 A.2d 507
(1983).
124. Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978);
Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18
(1971).
125. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714(b)-(c) (1985); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602(b)-(c)
(West Supp. 1985); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 30.955, .960 (1985).
126. 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971).
127. Id. at 636-37, 485 P.2d at 20-21.
128. Id. at 639, 485 P.2d at 21 (citing W. PnossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 33
(3d ed. 1964)).
129. Id.
130. See id. at 643, 485 P.2d at 23.
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In 1978, the California Supreme Court also recognized a cause of
action against social hosts in Coulter v. Superior Court.'31 In that
case, the owner of an apartment complex had served drinks to a
drunken party guest when he knew that the guest had a history of
excessive drinking. This guest had driven after the party, and had
caused an accident that had injured the plaintiff.3 2 Although the
trial court had sustained the apartment owner's demurrer to the
plaintiff's suit, the California Supreme Court reversed. The su-
preme court reasoned that, when a host knows that an obviously
intoxicated guest intends to drive, the host's service of alcoholic
beverages to that guest creates a reasonably foreseeable risk of in-
jury to motorists. 33 In the court's view, "[t]he danger of ultimate
harm is as equally foreseeable to the reasonably perceptive social
host as to the bartender," and "is equally as great, regardless of
the source of the liquor.' 34 The court concluded that social hosts
had a duty to prevent this harm,'35 and it consequently reversed
the lower court's decision to sustain the defendant's demurrer.'
The legislatures of California and Oregon responded to these
cases by passing statutes that eliminated, or at least severely lim-
ited, the potential scope of civil liability. The California legislature
reacted swiftly, amending its prior law within months. The
amended law expressly disapproved the result in Coulter and simi-
lar cases, and expressed the intent to "reinstate the prior judicial
interpretation" of the rules governing social host liability. 37 The
Oregon legislature followed suit in 1979, restricting liability to so-
cial hosts who serve visibly intoxicated guests 8" or who serve mi-
nors when "a reasonable person would have determined that
131. 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
132. Id. at 148, 577 P.2d at 671, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
133. Id. at 152, 577 P.2d at 673, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 538.
134. Id. at 153, 577 P.2d at 674, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 539.
135. Id. The California Supreme Court's decision to extend the duty to all social hosts
contrasts with the Oregon Supreme Court's decision in Wiener that a jury must examine the
circumstances of the particular case to determine whether the duty arose. See supra note
130 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 249-54 and accompanying text (comparing
the two approaches). For a thorough comparative analysis of Coulter and Wiener, see Gra-
ham, Liability of the Social Host for Injuries by the Negligent Acts of Intoxicated Guests,
16 WnLAmETrE L.J. 561 (1980).
136. 21 Cal. 3d at 155, 577 P.2d at 675, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
137. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
138. Oi. REv. STAT. § 30.955 (1985).
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identification should have been requested or that the identification
exhibited was altered or did not accurately describe the person to
whom the alcoholic liquor was sold or served."1 9
These negative legislative responses in other states, however, did
not deter the New Jersey Supreme Court from extending liability
to social hosts in 1984. The New Jersey court announced a social
host liability doctrine, based on a broad interpretation of tradi-
tional negligence principles, in its landmark decision in Kelly v.
Gwinnell.140 In that case, a couple had invited an individual to
their apartment and had served him the equivalent of thirteen
drinks, knowing that he would be driving home. After the guest
had left, his automobile had collided head-on with a car driven by
the plaintiff, causing severe injuries.141 The plaintiff had sued the
couple for her injuries, but the trial court had granted the couple's
motion for summary judgment, 14 2 and the New Jersey Superior
Court had affirmed the decision. 14 The New Jersey Supreme Court
reversed, however, holding that "the host may be liable under the
circumstances in this case. '1 44
The supreme court reasoned that the negligence principles that
it had applied to tavern owners in Rappaport v. Nichols14 5 and
subsequent cases146 were equally pertinent to social hosts. 47 The
court utilized the traditional negligence tests, inquiring whether
the situation involved an unreasonable risk of harm to others and
whether a reasonably prudent person would have foreseen the risk
and acted to prevent it.1 48 In applying these tests, the court
139. OR. REv. STAT. § 30.960 (1985). These new statutes apparently have had their in-
tended effect. See Johnson v. Paige, 47 Or. App. 1177, 615 P.2d 1185 (1980) (although new
statutes were not in effect when the accident occurred, passage of the statutes confirmed the
court's conclusion that a common law duty did not apply to the facts of the case).
140. 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
141. Id. at 541, 476 A.2d at 1220.
142. See id. at 541-42, 476 A.2d at 1220-21.
143. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 190 N.J. Super. 320, 463 A.2d 387 (1983), rev'd, 96 N.J. 538, 476
A.2d 1219 (1984).
144. 96 N.J. at 541, 476 A.2d at 1220.
145. 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); see supra notes 40-47 & 116-21 and accompanying
text.
146. Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966); Linn v. Rand,
140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (1976).
147. 96 N.J. at 545-47, 476 A.2d at 1222-24.
148. Id. at 543, 476 A.2d at 1221.
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focused on the great risk associated with drunk driving, and
reasoned that this known risk gave social hosts the same basis to
foresee the danger as it had given to tavern owners. 14 9 The court
concluded that liability should attach, at least when a social host
directly serves a guest whom the host knew would be driving.150
Because the hosts in Kelly had been in a one-to-one situation with
their guest, giving them a clear opportunity to foresee the danger
involved, the court concluded that they potentially were liable for
the plaintiff's injuries.' 5'
None of the courts that have extended liability to social hosts
since Kelly have relied exclusively on the New Jersey court's tradi-
tional negligence rationale. In Clark v. Mincks, 52 for example, the
Iowa Supreme Court did not rely on the general negligence princi-
ples articulated in Kelly, even though the court quoted Kelly ex-
tensively.' 53 The Iowa court based its finding of liability on the
hosts' violation of an Iowa criminal statute. 54 In Koback v.
Crook,'55 the Wisconsin Supreme Court also quoted Kelly exten-
sively,' 5 and considered many of the same policy issues157 and gen-
eral negligence issues, 58 but ultimately rested its holding on the
existence of statutory violations.' 59 The Georgia Supreme Court
did rely partially on general negligence principles to justify its ex-
tension of liability to social hosts in Sutter v. Hutchings,'" but
that was not the thrust of its opinion. Although much of the opin-
ion in Sutter focused on the principles of common law duty, fore-
seeable danger, and proximate cause, which the court viewed quite
149. See id. at 544-45, 476 A.2d at 1222.
150. Id. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224.
151. Id. at 559-60, 476 A.2d at 1230. The court reserved judgment concerning liability in
situations involving less direct contact between host and guest. Id. at 559, 476 A.2d at 1230.
152. 364 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1985) (en banc).
153. Id. at 230 (quoting Kelly, 96 N.J. at 548-49, 476 A.2d at 1224-25).
154. See id. at 231; supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
155. 123 Wis. 2d 259, 366 N.W.2d 857 (1985).
156. See 123 Wis. 2d at 269, 274-75, 275-76, 277, 366 N.W.2d at 861, 864, 865, 865.
157. See, e.g., id. at 268-69, 366 N.W.2d at 861 (considering the ability of social hosts to
spread the costs of liability); id. at 275-76, 366 N.W.2d at 865 (considering the effect of
potential liability on the atmosphere at social events).
158. See id. at 272-75, 366 N.W.2d at 863-64 (considering the remoteness of the injury
from the conduct).
159. See id. at 267, 366 N.W.2d at 861; supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
160. 254 Ga. 194, 327 S.E.2d 716 (1985); see supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
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similarly to the New Jersey court in Kelly,161 the Georgia court's
holding that a duty existed was based primarily on a violation of a
Georgia criminal statute.162
In contrast to Clark, Koback, and Sutter, four courts decided in
1985 to reject arguments urging social host liability based on negli-
gence principles.163 In the first of these four decisions, Keckonen v.
Robles,6 the Arizona Court of Appeals relied mainly on policy
considerations to reject social host liability. 6 5 These policy
161. See, e.g., 254 Ga. at 196-97, 197, 327 S.E.2d at 718, 719 (considering whether the case
involved "unreasonable risk of harm"); id. at 197-98, 327 S.E.2d at 719 (considering foresee-
ability and proximate cause issues).
162. See id. at 197, 327 S.E.2d at 718-19; supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
One major flaw in the general negligence analysis that the court did undertake in Sutter is
the scant attention the court paid to the inherent differences between bar owners and social
hosts. For example, the court cited tavern owner cases for the same propositions and with
the same force as social host cases. See, e.g., Taylor v. Ruiz, 394 A.2d 765 (Del. 1978) (cited
in Sutter, 254 Ga. at 196, 327 S.E.2d at 718, in the same string citation as Kelly and other
social host liability cases, to support the proposition that acceptance of liability was wide-
spread). The court's only acknowledgment of the argument that social hosts and tavern
owners were different was its rejection of the hosts' argument that, unlike commercial pro-
prietors, they did not have bouncers available to control their guests' conduct. See supra
note 76 and accompanying text.
In one other social host liability case decided after Kelly, an Indiana court discussed gen-
eral policy issues briefly, but focused primarily on statutorily-based theories. See Ashlock v.
Norris, 475 N.E.2d 1167, 1169 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); supra notes 79-86. The Michigan Su-
preme Court, on the other hand, discussed only statutory violations when it extended liabil-
ity to social hosts in 1985. See Longstreth v. Gensel, 423 Mich. 675, 377 N.W.2d 804 (1985);
supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
163. Keckonen v. Robles, 146 Ariz. 268, 705 P.2d 945 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (review de-
nied); Holmquist v. Miller, 367 N.W.2d 468 (Minn. 1985); Boutwell v. Sullivan, 469 So. 2d
526 (Miss. 1985); Harriman v. Smith, 697 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). The courts in
Boutwell and Harriman also rejected arguments urging negligence liabilty based on hosts'
criminal violations. See supra notes 104-15 and accompanying text.
The fifth 1985 case in which social host liability was rejected, Bankston v. Brennan, 480
So. 2d 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985), involved only an argument that liability should be
imposed based on statutory violations. See supra note 115.
In cases decided before 1985, several other courts had rejected social host liability based
on negligence principles. See Keckonen, 146 Ariz. at 270 n.2, 705 P.2d at 947 n.2 (noting the
rejection of social host liability in eleven jurisdictions).
164. 146 Ariz. 268, 705 P.2d 945 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (review denied).
165. According to the court "The decision by a court to impose liability is a policy deci-
sion .... 'No better general statement can be made than that the courts will find a duty
where, in general, reasonable persons would recognize it and agree that it exists.'" Id. at
271-72, 705 P.2d at 948-49 (quoting W. KEETN, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 359 (5th ed. 1984)). The court concluded that "reasona-
ble persons would [not] extend to the social host the liability imposed on the tavern keeper"
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considerations included the host's lesser ability to control guests,
compared to tavern owners;16 the host's inability to spread the
costs of liability to patrons; 167 the potential flood of litigation;1 68
and the desire to leave the issue to the legislature. 6 9 The court
characterized Kelly, which to its knowledge made New Jersey the
only state in which social host liability prevailed,1 70 as a decision in
which "[a]ny thoughts of judicial restraint were not visible. 17 1 In
the remaining three cases in which liability based on negligence
principles was rejected, courts in Minnesota, Mississippi, and Mis-
souri relied on similar policy rationales. 72
Even in the six jurisdictions in which social host liability now
prevails, the extent of liability is debatable, particularly when large
social gatherings are involved. The New Jersey court in Kelly, for
example, specifically limited its decision to cases involving direct,
one-to-one contact between a host and a guest, and expressly re-
served judgment concerning whether the same principles would ap-
ply to large gatherings.17 3 The Iowa court's opinion in Clark con-
tained similar limitations.17 4 The Georgia court's opinion in Sutter,
because "[tihe consequences of imposing such a duty are economically and socially stagger-
ing." Id. at 272, 705 P.2d at 949.
166. Id. at 270, 705 P.2d at 947 (citing Settlemyer v. Wilmington Veteran's Post No. 49,
11 Ohio St. 3d 123, 464 N.E.2d 521 (1984)).
167. Id. (quoting DeMoulin & Whitcomb, Social Host's Liability in Furnishing Alcoholic
Beverages, 27 FED'N INs. CouNs. Q. 349, 357 (1977)).
168. Id. (citing Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 Ill. App. 2d 412, 199 N.E.2d 300
(1964)).
169. Id. (citing Lowe v. Rubin, 98 IlM. App. 3d 496, 424 N.E.2d 710 (1981), and Miller v.
Moran, 96 Ill. App. 3d 596, 421 N.E.2d 1046 (1981)).
170. See id. The first four 1985 decisions in which courts imposed liability on social hosts
were decided between March 14 and April 30. Keckonen was decided on April 24.
171. Id. at 271, 705 P.2d at 948.
172. See Holmquist v. Miller, 367 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. 1985) (focusing on the need to
defer to legislative judgment); Boutwell v. Sullivan, 469 So. 2d 526, 529 (Miss. 1985) (noting
both the host's inability to control guests and the need to defer to the legislature); Harriman
v. Smith, 697 S.W.2d 219, 221-22 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (noting the distinctions between social
hosts and tavern owners, as well as the importance of deference to the legislature).
The tendency of courts to reject social host liability based on general negligence principles
continued in 1986. See Garren v. Cummings & McCurdy, Inc., No. 0727, slip op. (S.C. Ct.
App. June 9, 1986).
173. Kelly, 96 N.J. at 559, 476 A.2d at 1230.
174. The Iowa court in Clark limited its opinion to situations in which
(1) the guest was intoxicated, (2) the host personally was actually aware the
guest was intoxicated, (3) the host then made beer (or other intoxicating bever-
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however, contained broad language arguably applicable to both
small and large gatherings.""
Even if one narrowly interprets Sutter and other social host lia-
bility decisions, blanket social host liability is the next logical step
in the current trend. The principles underlying liability arguably
apply with equal force to larger gatherings, because any reasonably
prudent social host realizes that many guests travel by automobile,
and that many guests may drink excessively if given access to an
open bar. This knowledge in no way depends on the size of the
gathering.' 76 Mere similarity between the principles underlying
ages) available to the guest, (4) the guest drank the beer (or beverages), (5) the
guest, while intoxicated, then operated a motor vehicle, and (6) by reason of
the intoxication, the guest operated the vehicle in a manner which caused in-
jury to (or the death of) the plaintiff (or the plaintiff's decedent).
Clark, 364 N.W.2d at 231. Condition (2), requiring the host's personal awareness of the
guest's intoxication, would prevent liability in most situations involving large gatherings.
The courts in Longstreth and Koback imposed even more limited liability than the courts
in Kelly and Clark. These courts limited their holdings to situations in which a host served
a minor, and did not discuss whether liability could stem from service to an adult. See
Longstreth v. Gensel, 423 Mich. 675, 685-86, 377 N.W.2d 804, 809 (1985); Koback v. Crook,
123 Wis. 2d 259, 277-78, 366 N.W.2d 857, 866 (1985) (Bablitch, J., concurring).
175. The Georgia court in Sutter stated that a jury could find any social host liable "who
encouraged another, who was noticeably intoxicated and under the legal drinking age, to
become further intoxicated and who furnished to such other person more alcohol, knowing
that such person would soon be driving a vehicle." 254 Ga. at 199, 327 S.E.2d at 720. The
court distinguished earlier cases applying the common law rule of nonliability, see, e.g., Kea-
ton v. Kroger, 143 Ga. App. 23, 237 S.E.2d 443 (1977), by stating that these cases did not
involve situations in which the "defendants furnished alcohol to a person who the defend-
ants knew would soon be driving his car and who was noticeably intoxicated when the alco-
hol was furnished." Sutter, 254 Ga. at 195, 327 S.E.2d at 717.
Both of these statements arguably require only general knowledge that a guest would be
driving a car to and from the gathering, and not specific knowledge that a particular guest
was intoxicated. The first statement requires only that the host "encouraged" further intoxi-
cation, not that he actually supplied liquor to a specific guest. See id. at 199, 327 N.E.2d at
720. The reference to furnishing alcohol in the second statement also does not contain any
requirement of one-to-one contact. See id. at 195, 327 N.E.2d at 717.
176. Cf. Langle v. Kurkul, No. 82-254, slip op. at - (Vt. Mar. 21, 1986) (Gibson, J.,
dissenting) ("Once a cause of action in negligence is recognized for the overserving of alco-
hol to obviously intoxicated potential drivers and minors, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
deny the existence of a cause of action in other egregious situations.").
So far, courts have not applied liability to hosts of large gatherings. See infra note 188
and accompanying text. In Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 534 (1978), the California Supreme Court did find liability in a case involving a rela-
tively large gathering at an apartment complex. That court, however, indicated that it would
not find liability without evidence that the host affirmatively furnished alcoholic beverages
to a particular individual. See infra note 188. Even this rule apparently was too broad for
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liability for hosts of small and large gatherings, however, does not
justify extension of the liability doctrine. The broader issue of so-
cial host liability requires a more thorough analysis.
SHOULD THE COURTS EMBRACE SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY?
The New Jersey Supreme Court's 1959 decision in Rappaport v.
Nichols'77 started a nationwide trend toward holding tavern own-
ers liable for damages caused by their patrons' alcohol-related acci-
dents. Today, a majority of jurisdictions find actionable negligence
in at least some circumstances involving tavern owners. 17 Twenty-
five years later, the same court's decision in Kelly v. Gwinnell 7 9
seems to have started a similar trend toward holding social hosts
liable for such damages. In the first year after Kelly, courts in five
other jurisdictions imposed liability. 180 Courts in other jurisdic-
tions soon may be asked to decide the same issue. These courts not
only should consider the legal merits of social host liability, but
also should analyze the policy considerations carefully. These pol-
icy considerations differ significantly from the considerations that
accompany tavern owner liability.
Legal Analysis
Most states do not have dram shop statutes' 81 or other laws that
directly address the civil liability of tavern owners or social hosts.
Many states that had dram shop statutes either have repealed
them182 or purposely have interpreted them narrowly. 8 3 Any trend
toward social host liability, therefore, more likely will come from
court decisions similar to Kelly, which rely on negligence princi-
ples, rather than from new statutes or from new interpretations of
old statutes.
the California legislature, which acted a year later effectively to reverse Coulter. See supra
notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
177. 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); see supra notes 40-47 & 116-21 and accompanying
text.
178. See supra note 6.
179. 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984); see supra notes 140-51 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 19.
182. See supra note 31.
183. See supra note 22 and accompanying text,
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In traditional negligence analysis of social host liability cases,
three considerations are pivotal: first, whether the injurious
consequences of the conduct are reasonably foreseeable at the time
and place of the act; 1 4 second, whether the injurious consequences
are related sufficiently to the conduct to meet the test of proximate
cause;18 5 and third, whether imposing a legal duty is fundamentally
fair given the possible benefits and the resulting burdens on the
social host.1 86
Foreseeability
In the social host liability cases decided to date, most courts
have had little difficulty with the question of foreseeability. Courts
generally have asserted, without explanation, that particular hosts
easily could have predicted that furnishing more drinks to a
184. See Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 152, 577 P.2d 669, 674, 145 Cal. Rptr.
534, 539 (1978); Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 198, 327 S.E.2d 716, 719 (1985); Kelly v.
Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 543, 476 A.2d 1219, 1221 (1984).
185. The proximate cause question was the primary justification for the common law rule
of nonliability for anyone who sold or supplied liquor to a person who later became involved
in an accident. See Megge v. United States, 344 F.2d 31, 32 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
831 (1965); State v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 254-55, 78 A.2d 754, 756-57 (1951).
In the initial cases overturning the rule of nonliability with respect to tavern owners,
courts rejected this position. E.g., Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 203-04, 156 A.2d 1, 9
(1959). The early cases approving social host liability, however, do not reflect any reconsid-
eration of proximate cause in light of the different circumstances involved in social gather-
ings. See Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978);
Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 327 S.E.2d 716 (1985); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476
A.2d 1219 (1984); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or.
632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971).
To some extent, questions of foreseeability, see supra note 184, are implicit in any con-
sideration of proximate cause. Other factors, however, also are relevant. The New York
Court of Appeals articulated the classic formulation of the tests for proximate cause in Pal-
sgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928):
The court must ask itself whether there was a natural and continuous sequence
between cause and effect. Was the one a substantial factor in producing the
other? Was there a direct connection between them, without too many inter-
vening causes? Is the effect of cause on result not too attentuated? Is the cause
likely, in the usual judgment of mankind, to produce the result? Or, by the
exercise of prudent foresight, could the result be foreseen? Is the result too
remote from the cause, and here we consider the remoteness in time and space.
Id. at 354, 162 N.E. at 104 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
186. See Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 154, 577 P.2d 669, 674-75, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 534, 539-40 (1978); Clark v. Mincks, 364 N.W.2d 226, 230 (Iowa 1985) (en banc); Kelly
v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 544, 476 A.2d 1219, 1222 (1984).
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driving guest would create a significant risk of harm to other
motorists. 87 While these findings may have been accurate in the
particular cases involved, they should not operate as general max-
ims applicable to all fact situations involving social hosts. In many
cases, the existence of reasonable foreseeability is a much closer
question.
When a bartender or a social host has one-to-one contact with
his guest, a finding of reasonable foreseeability is sound because
the bartender or host has control over the drinks served. He can
see the guest and judge the danger involved if the guest has an-
other drink. At a party or large social gathering, on the other hand,
the host often lacks the ability to assess and foresee the danger.
Individual guests frequently serve themselves without any contact
with the host that would give the host an opportunity to assess the
possible danger. Absent this opportunity, courts generally have re-
fused to find negligence on the part of social hosts.188
For a court to find foreseeability in a large social gathering in-
volving little or no one-to-one contact between host and guests, the
court would have to base its finding on the host's general knowl-
edge that one of his guests might overindulge and create a hazard
on the highway. 89 Liability based on such general knowledge
places a duty on social hosts to monitor all of their guests' alcohol
187. See, e.g., Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 152-53, 577 P.2d 669, 674, 145
Cal. Rptr. 534, 539 (1978) ("We think it evident that the service of alcoholic beverages to an
obviously intoxicated person by one who knows that such intoxicated person intends to
drive a motor vehicle creates a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury to those on the high-
way." (emphasis by the court)); Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 195, 198, 327 S.E.2d 716, 719
(1985) ("[W]here one provides alcohol to a noticeably intoxicated 17-year-old knowing that
he will soon be driving his car, it is foreseeable to the provider that the consumer will drive
while intoxicated and a jury would be authorized to find that it is foreseeable to the pro-
vider that the intoxicated driver may injure someone.").
188. See Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534
(1978) (no liability because plaintiff did not allege that defendant affirmatively furnished
the intoxicated individual with liquor); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984)
(foreseeability established only in a situation in which 'single guest was invited to defend-
ant's home and served the equivalent of thirteen drinks); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of
Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971) (no liability merely for pro-
viding a room where alcoholic beverages were served). But see supra note 175 and accompa-
nying text.
189. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 27:583
SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY
intakes closely. Even if social hosts can handle this burden, 90 most
reasonable persons would not expect hosts to undertake it.' 9'
Although these considerations illustrate the problems with find-
ing foreseeability in large social gatherings, pressure associated
with increasing public awareness of the dangers of drunk driving 92
may prompt courts to find foreseeability even in these contexts. A
judicial finding of foreseeability alone, however, cannot result in a
judgment for the plaintiff. Courts must analyze other elements of
negligence before determining a social host's liability.
Proximate Cause
Under common law, courts relied on proximate cause as the pri-
mary rationale for refusing to extend civil liability to tavern own-
ers and social hosts. These courts generally reasoned that the act
of serving the liquor was too remote from the subsequent automo-
bile accident to qualify as the proximate cause of the accident.9 3
Remoteness of the act from the injury, both temporal and spatial,
is one factor relevant to a court's determination of proximate
cause, but it is not the only factor. Courts also must consider fac-
tors such as the directness of the connection between the injury
and the conduct and the existence of intervening causes. 94
Cases in which courts have overturned the common law rule of
nonliability reflect scant consideration of the proximate cause issue
or of the relevant factors. In some tavern owner cases, courts have
addressed this issue briefly by asserting that the injury resulted in
the ordinary course of events flowing from the tavern owner's neg-
ligence. 9 5 These courts, however, have failed to give in-depth
treatment to all of the considerations involved. The recent cases in
which courts have imposed liability on social hosts reflect even less
190. The burden of controlling guests is difficult for social hosts, particularly in large
gatherings. See infra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
191. See Keckonen v. Robles, 146 Ariz. 268, 272, 705 P.2d 945, 949 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985)
(review denied).
192. See supra note 1.
193. See Megge v. United States, 344 F.2d 31, 32 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 831
(1965); State v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 254-55, 78 A.2d 754, 756-57 (1951).
194. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 354, 162 N.E. 99, 104 (1928) (Andrews, J.,
dissenting); see supra note 185.
195. See, e.g., Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 203-04, 156 A.2d 1, 9 (1959).
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careful consideration of the issue. Some of these courts have ne-
glected to consider proximate cause at all,1 96 while others that have
mentioned the issue have downplayed its importance.197
Proximate cause is an essential element of negligence analysis
that courts must review when extending tort liability to either tav-
ern operators or social hosts. The analysis, however, is the same
whether it involves a tavern owner or a social host. If a court views
a commercial sale of drinks to a customer as the proximate cause
of an alcohol-related accident, then it also should view a gratuitous
service of drinks to a guest as the proximate cause of a similar
accident. The relationship between cause and effect is identical in
both cases.19 8 If a court is to justify imposition of tavern owner
liability but not social host liability, it must distinguish these situ-
ations either on general policy grounds or on legal grounds other
than proximate cause.
Fairness of Imposing a Duty
Although courts may discuss issues such as foreseeability and
proximate cause in tavern owner or social host cases, the general
fairness of imposing a legal duty seems to carry more weight in
these courts' analyses.199 In fact, the fundamental fairness of any
new legal duty is a crucial determinant of whether a court should
impose tort liability under any new theory.00 Courts considering
196. See, e.g., Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534
(1978); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984); Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter
of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971).
197. See, e.g. Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 197-98, 327 S.E.2d 716, 719 (1985).
198. See Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259, 274, 366 N.W.2d 857, 864 (1985).
199. See Keckonen v. Robles, 146 Ariz. 268, 271, 705 P.2d 945, 948 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985)
("The decision by a court to impose liability is a policy decision.") (review denied); Coulter
v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 153, 577 P.2d 669, 674, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534, 539 (1978)
(citing seven general fairness factors relevant to the determination of whether to impose a
legal duty); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984) (relying mainly upon gen-
eral policy considerations to justify imposing a legal duty upon social hosts); Koback v.
Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259, 366 N.W.2d 857 (1985) (considering a number of general policy
considerations); see also Osen v. Copeland, 90 Wis. 2d 483, 488, 280 N.W.2d 178, 180 (1979)
(citing six public policy considerations that were relevant to its decision not to impose a
legal duty) (overruled in Sorensen v. Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627, 350 N.W.2d 108 (1984)).
200. "Whether a duty exists is ultimately a question of fairness. The inquiry involves a
weighing of the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk, and the public interest in
the proposed solution." Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 583, 186 A.2d 291, 293
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fundamental fairness take two basic approaches. Some take an ad
hoc approach, discussing only factors that come to mind as rele-
vant to a particular situation.201 Other courts, however, have devel-
oped comprehensive formulas designed to weigh all of the impor-
tant factors.202
One of the most widely accepted and frequently cited of these
fairness formulas is the test that Judge Learned Hand developed
in United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 203 According to Judge
Hand, a court deciding whether to impose a new legal duty must
consider three factors: first, the probability that the injury will oc-
cur; second, the gravity of the injury if it does occur; and third, the
burden of taking precautions adequate to prevent the injury.204 If
the probability and the gravity of the injury do not outweigh the
burden of its- prevention, the formula directs courts not to impose
a legal dutyoto prevent the injury.205 Although some courts consid-
ering social host liability have applied a form of the Carroll Tow-
ing test,20 their benefit/burden analyses have been flawed and
incomplete.07
(1962) (emphasis by the court); see also Keckonen v. Robles, 146 Ariz. 268, 271, 705 P.2d
945, 948 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) ("The decision by a court to impose liability is a policy deci-
sion.") (review denied).
201. See, e.g., Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 544-48, 476 A.2d 1219, 1222-24 (1984);
Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259, 267-76, 366 N.W.2d 857, 861-65 (1985).
202. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 113, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr.
97, 100 (1968) (identifying seven factors to determine whether a legal duty would be funda-
mentally fair) (applied in Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 153, 577 P.2d 669, 674,
145 Cal. Rptr. 534, 539 (1978)).
203. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
204. Id. at 173.
205. Id.
206. Although these courts did not apply the Carroll Towing formula directly, they did
analyze the benefits and burdens of social host liability under a similar approach. See, e.g.,
Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984) (analyzing the gravity of the harm
using, drunk driving statistics, and analyzing the burdens of preventing the harm and of
obtaining adequate insurance).
207. Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 327 S.E.2d 716 (1985), provides a prime example of
inadequate benefit/burden analysis. In Sutter, the court's entire benefit/burden analysis
consisted of the following statement:
Finally, we pose this question: Which is the more valuable right, the right to
serve alcohol to one's underage high school friends, or the right not to be killed
by an intoxicated underage driver? There is no right to serve alcohol to one's
underage high school friends.
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Benefits
Courts generally have evaluated the benefit side of Judge Hand's
formula, which includes both the probability and gravity issues, ei-
ther by using emotional language to describe the scope of the prob-
lem 20 8 or by reciting statistics enumerating the deaths and injuries
Id. at 198-99, 327 S.E.2d at 720. This statement overestimates the benefits of the court's
decision because the court does not consider how many deaths at the hands of "intoxicated
underage drivers" could be attributed to social hosts or how many deaths might be pre-
vented by a social host liability rule. See infra notes 208-14 and accompanying text. Like-
wise, the statement underestimates the burdens that would flow from the court's decision
because the court considered only the chilling effect a social host liability rule would have
on underage drinkers. The court failed to consider other more important burdens, such as
the costs of insurance and preventative measures. See infra notes 215-26 and accompanying
text.
Commentary concerning the benefits and burdens of social host liability contains similar
flaws. One author, for example, has suggested that Judge Hand's formula supported a Texas
decision imposing liability on an employer in a context that at least resembled social host
liability. See Note, Expanding Third Party Liability for Failure to Control the Intoxicated
Employee Who Drives, Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark, 18 CONN. L. REV. 155, 176-77 (1985).
The author overstated the benefits of the Texas decision, however, and totally ignored its
burdens. Rather than considering only the drunk driving problem associated with employers
or even with social hosts in general, the writer portrayed the benefits of the rule as if it
would eliminate drunk driving, including drunk driving unconnected with employers or
other social hosts. See id. ("The risks posed by drunken drivers are all too obvious."). The
writer then immediately concluded that these benefits supported imposition of a high de-
gree of care, without considering any of the potential burdens associated with preventing
the risk. See id. at 177.
208. For example, in Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 534 (1978), the California Supreme Court stated:
[W]e must surely balance. . . the serious hazard to the lives, limbs, and prop-
erty of the public at large, and the great potential for human suffering which
attends the presence on the highways of intoxicated drivers. In doing so we
need not ignore the appalling, perhaps incalculable, cost of torn and broken
lives incident to alcohol abuse, in the area of automobile accidents alone.
The dimensions of this cost and its catastrophic personal and economic im-
pact in terms of vehicular accidents, are profoundly disturbing social phenom-
ena of our time.
Id. at 154, 577 P.2d at 675, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 540. A statement made by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259, 366 N.W.2d 857 (1985), provides a
more recent example:
We need not dwell on the grim statistics of death or mayhem on the high-
ways to justify our support of. .. the New Jersey court [in Kelly]. We need
only look to the consequences of the alleged negligence by the host in the in-
stant case-a young woman physically, emotionally, and mentally crippled, a
consequence that all too often is the result of uncontrolled furnishing of alco-
holic beverages, whether at private affairs or in commercial settings.
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attributable to drunk driving. 09 These emotional statements and
gruesome statistics, however, do not accurately reflect the benefits
that would flow from a social host liability rule because they focus
not just on the portion of the drunk driving problem attributable
to social hosts, but rather on the drunk driving problem in its en-
tirety. These analyses implicitly assume that the benefit of social
host liability would be the complete elimination of drunk driving,
but they offer no evidence that social host liability would have any
impact on drunk driving, much less such a significant impact.210
A proper benefit analysis would focus only on the benefits that
likely would flow from a social host liability rule. Because only a
few states have accepted social host liability, and most of those
states rejected liability until recently, the amount of data that
would be useful for such an analysis is limited.21  The data that is
available, however, indicates that social host liability would have a
minimal impact, at most, on drunken driving. In California, for ex-
ample, alcohol-related highway fatalities increased by almost
twenty percent between 1976 and 1978, during the period that it
recognized social host liability, but began to decrease immediately
Id. at 276, 366 N.W. at 865; see also Ashlock v. Norris, 475 N.E.2d 1167, 1169 (Ind. Ct. App.
1985) (referring to the "carnage on our public highways"); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538,
545, 476 A.2d 1219, 1222 (1984) (stating that damage from drunk driving deaths "is re-
garded increasingly as intolerable").
209. Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 154, 577 P.2d 669, 675, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534,
540 (1978); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 544-45 & n.3, 476 A.2d 1219, 1222 & n.3 (1984).
210. In Kelly, the New Jersey Supreme Court did recognize that social host liability had
no proven impact, but it failed to take that fact into account in its benefit analysis:
While the rule in this case will tend also to deter drunken driving, there is no
assurance that it will have any significant effect.... We need not, however,
condition the imposition of a duty on scientific proof that it will result in the
behavior that is one of its goals.
Id. at 551-52, 476 A.2d at 1226.
Another problem with many courts' benefit analyses is their failure to take into account
the impact that other recent measures already have had on drunken driving. See, e.g., id. at
545, 476 A.2d at 1222 (noting New Jersey's recent enactment of stronger criminal sanctions,
but failing to take this fact into account in deciding whether the further step of social host
liability was necessary).
211. Courts in only nine states have accepted social host liability even to a limited extent,
see supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text, and the legislatures in three of these states
have passed laws effectively overruling these decisions, see supra note 10 and accompanying
text. In the six remaining states, the oldest case in which liability was extended to social
hosts was decided in 1984. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984). As a result,
no state has had more than a few years' experience with social host liability.
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after the legislature repealed social host liability.212 Other states
have had similar experiences,"' The lack of impact of social host
liability in these states contrasts sharply with the immediate and
sizeable impact that recently enacted criminal sanctions have had
on drunk driving. 1 4
If social host liability really had a significant impact on drunk
driving, the accident statistics should have shown a change that
was at least somewhat analogous to the change accompanying
tougher criminal sanctions. Instead, these accident statistics reflect
no favorable change. On the benefit side of the analysis, therefore,
courts should have weighed only a speculative and, at best, mini-
mal positive effect, rather than elimination of the entire drunk
212. Deaths attributable to alcohol-related accidents in California rose from 3102 in 1976
to 3457 in 1977, 3714 in 1978, and 4012 in 1979, but dropped to 4009 in 1980 and 3814 in
1981. Telephone Interview with Robert Calvin, Safety Director of the Highway Users Feder-
ation (Oct. 16, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Telephone Interview].
213. In Iowa, a social host liability rule was in effect from 1972, when the Iowa Supreme
Court decided Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972), until 1979, when the
Iowa legislature effectively abrogated Williams, IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West Supp.
1985) (amending IOWA CODE ANN. § 129.2 (West 1949)). See supra note 10. After 579 motor-
ists died from drunk driving accidents in Iowa during 1976, the death toll rose from 478 in
1977 to 485 in 1978 and 509 in 1979. The toll was lower, however, in the first two years after
the Iowa legislature repealed social host liability. The toll fell to 477 in 1980, and it rose
only to 483 in 1981. Telephone Interview, supra note 212.
The lack of impact in these states could stem from a number of factors, such as a lack of
awareness of potential liability among social hosts. See DeMoulin & Whitcomb, supra note
167, at 357. Regardless of the cause, however, the lack of impact demonstrated by this data
is impressive.
214. See, e.g. War on Alcohol Abuse Spreads to New Fronts, supra note 1, at 63 (report-
ing that deaths caused by drunk driving declined from 28,000 in 1980 to 23,600 in 1984);
Outrage over Drunk Driving, supra note 1, at 18 (reporting that overall traffic fatalities
declined from 49,000 in 1981 to 44,000 in 1982).
Some states have achieved even more remarkable reductions. For example, the Washing-
ton legislature enacted a series of stricter laws beginning in 1980. Mainly because of these
new measures, the number of drunk driving deaths in Washington dropped from 516 in 1981
to 442 in 1982 and 364 in 1983, and the tally of alcohol-related accidents declined from
17,000 in 1981 to 14,500 in 1982 and 12,900 in 1983. 130 CONG. REc. S8227 (daily ed. June
26, 1984) (statement of Sen. Evans). The experience in New Jersey before social hosts be-
came liable was similar. After new criminal sanctions were passed and enforcement efforts
were intensified, drunk driving arrests increased forty percent between 1980 and 1984. As a
result, between 1981 and 1983, deaths attributable to drunk driving dropped from 376 to
270, a twenty-eight percent decline. NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES, SAFErY, SER-
VICE, INTEGRITY, A REPORT ON THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF MOTOR
VEHICLES 44 (1983) (cited in Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 552 n.11, 476 A.2d 1219, 1226
n.11 (1984)).
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driving problem. Viewed in this manner, close scrutiny of the bur-
dens side of the equation becomes even more important.
Burdens
The burdens associated with social host liability are considera-
ble. If liability were imposed, private individuals who decided to
host modest social gatherings would have to assume responsibility
for any accidents related to their guests' alcohol consumption. The
burden of shouldering this responsibility, or insuring against it,
probably would discourage many hosts from entertaining at all. 15
Social hosts and tavern owners differ in many ways, and these
differences generally make the burdens of liability far greater for
social hosts than for tavern owners. Proprietors of commercial es-
tablishments usually have experienced employees to dispense
drinks, while social hosts generally have no employees and cannot
directly control their guests' alcohol consumption. Even if a social
host did have a few friends voluntarily act as bartenders, these
friends would lack the professional experience necessary to deter-
mine when an individual has consumed too much alcohol or has
falsified his age to get a drink.21 Commercial establishments also
have the advantage of bouncers who can help control situations in
which customers challenge decisions not to serve more drinks.
Without these advantages, social hosts may be held responsible for
unfortunate accidents which they had little or no opportunity to
prevent.218
215. For a general discussion of the burdens of a rule imposing liability upon social hosts,
see Casenote, Liability of Social Host for Furnishing Liquor to Guest Who Later Injures a
Third Person, 25 WAYNE L. REv. 975, 983-84 (1979).
216. See Boutwell v. Sullivan, 469 So. 2d 526, 529 (Miss. 1985); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J.
538, 566-68, 476 A.2d 1219, 1234 (1984) (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
217. See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 567, 476 A.2d 1219, 1234 (Garibaldi, J., dissent-
ing). But see Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 197, 327 S.E.2d 716, 719 (1985) (rejecting an
argument against social host liability based on the lack of bouncers, reasoning that a host's
duty is to refrain from serving in the first place, not to control drunken guests once they
have been served).
218. See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 566-68, 476 A.2d 1219, 1234 (Garibaldi, J., dis-
senting). Justice Garibaldi also noted in her dissent that social hosts, unlike commercial
bartenders, often drink with their guests, further contributing to their inability to control
their guests' behavior. Id. at 566-67, 476 A.2d 1234.
The burdens and costs associated with attempting to control guests' behavior are consid-
erably greater at large social gatherings than they would be in one-to-one situations, which
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Social hosts generally have far fewer financial resources than
tavern owners, making them far less able to take costly measures
to control guests' behavior, or to shoulder the costs of liability or
adequate insurance when they are unable to control guests' behav-
ior.21 9 To a great extent, tavern owners gain this financial advan-
tage from their ability to distribute costs among their patrons. As
Justice Garibaldi pointed out in her dissent in Kelly: "The most
significant difference between a social host and a commercial licen-
see . . . is the social host's inability to spread the cost of liability.
The commercial establishment spreads the cost of insurance
against liability among its customers. The social host must bear
the entire cost alone. '220
Even if liability insurance would be available to protect social
hosts,22' it would not provide an escape from the tremendous
are the only circumstances in which courts have found liability so far. See Casenote, supra
note 215, at 983-84; supra note 188 and accompanying text.
219. Some courts have focused on the financial position of social hosts to justify a rejec-
tion of liability. See, e.g., Cory v. Shierloh, 29 Cal. 3d 430, 441, 629 P.2d 8, 14, 174 Cal. Rptr.
500, 506 (1981) ("[L]icensees are in a better position to defray the costs of liability and
insurance than the usual 'social host' or other unlicensed provider."); Lowe v. Rubin, 98 Ill.
App. 496, 499, 424 N.E.2d 710, 713 (1981) (noting that the social host, unlike the tavern
owner, "'receives no pecuniary gain for providing alcoholic beverages to his guest and will
have to personally absorb the cost of insurance or other security' ") (quoting DeMoulin &
Whitcomb, supra note 167, at 357); see also Keckonen v. Robles, 146 Ariz. 268, 270, 705
P.2d 945, 947 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (quoting the above-mentioned passage from Lowe v.
Rubin) (review denied); Special Project, supra note 10, at 1121-22 (1985) (noting some
courts' use of social hosts' inability to pass on costs to customers as a justification for refusal
to impose liability).
220. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 568, 476 A.2d 1219, 1234 (1984) (Garibaldi, J., dis-
senting). The experience of New Hampshire bar owners provides an example of the relative
burdens. When New Hampshire bars were faced with a twelve-fold increase in liquor liabil-
ity insurance premiums, they were able to pass on the cost to their customers by raising
prices no more than eighteen cents per drink. See Sorry, Your Policy is Canceled, TIME,
Mar. 24, 1986, at 25 (reporting statement of New Hampshire Insurance Commissioner Louis
Bergeron). Social hosts, on the other hand, cannot pass on these costs. Instead, they would
have to absorb such huge premium increases personally.
221. The availability of insurance at any cost to protect social hosts is not a foregone
conclusion. Compare Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 153, 577 P.2d 669, 674, 145
Cal. Rptr. 534, 539 (1978) ("[W]e may assume that insurance coverage (doubtless increas-
ingly costly) will be made available to protect the social host from liability in this situa-
tion.") and Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259, 268, 366 N.W.2d 857, 861 (1985) ("[I]t was
conceded at oral argument that the defendant's homeowners liability policy provided cover-
age for the kind of claim asserted in this case.") with Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 568,
476 A.2d 1219, 1235 (1984) (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) ("The majority cites no authority for
its belief that actions against social hosts will be covered under homeowner's insurance.").
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financial burdens that civil liability would impose. In fact, it would
add to these burdens. Even courts that use the availability of in-
surance to justify liability agree that any available insurance would
be at higher premiums.222 The past experiences of tavern owners
indicate that the rise in premiums would be extremely high. In the
District of Columbia, for example, one bar owner found that his
premiums for liquor liability insurance jumped from $185 in 1984
to $26,500 in 1985 for half the amount of coverage. 22 3 Similar ex-
periences have become commonplace nationwide.224 Many tavern
owners faced with these enormous premiums have elected to "go
bare," carrying no liability insurance and hoping that they will not
be sued.225 Because social hosts generally have fewer financial re-
sources than commercial dispensers, such high premiums might re-
sult in even more decisions not to carry insurance. Even hosts who
do not elect to "go bare" ultimately might be without coverage
against most civil liability claims because of policy provisions that
222. See, e.g., Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 153, 577 P.2d 669, 674, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 534, 539 (1978); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 550 n.9, 476 A.2d 1219, 1225 n.9
(1984). In her dissent in Kelly, Justice Garibaldi pointed out the impact of the rise in pre-
miums and the unavailability of affordable insurance:
Even if it is assumed that homeowner's insurance will cover this cause of ac-
tion, it is unrealistic to believe that insurance companies will not raise their
premiums in response to it.
Furthermore, many homeowners and apartment renters may not even have
homeowner's insurance and probably cannot afford it. Other homeowners may
not have sufficient insurance to cover the limitless liability that the Court
seeks to impose.
96 N.J. at 568, 476 A.2d at 1235 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
223. Marcus, Liquor Liability Coverage Drying Up, Wash. Post, Nov. 10, 1985, at B1, col.
4. The insurance company raised these premiums, even though no District of Columbia
court actually had held a tavern owner civilly liable, on the grounds that the District courts
probably would find liability when they considered the issue. Id. at B10, cols. 2-3.
224. See, e.g., Special Project, supra note 10, at 1120 (noting that one California tavern
owner's insurance premium climbed from $10,000 to $190,000 after the courts began impos-
ing civil liability); Sorry, Your Policy is Canceled, supra note 220, at 25 (reporting one New
Hampshire bar's sponsorship of "Unhappy Hour" after its annual liability premiums rose
from $1000 to $12,000). But see id. at 26 (reporting that New Jersey insurance companies
have threatened to increase homeowners' premiums in response to social host liability, but
have not actually done so yet).
225. See id. at 1120 (noting that approximately one-third of California's 25,000 tavern
owners chose to risk liability rather than to pay the high premiums that followed the Cali-
fornia courts' imposition of civil liability); Marcus, supra note 223, at B1, col 6 (reporting
that a "substantial proportion" of restaurants in the District of Columbia are "out on a
limb" because they have no liquor liability coverage).
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exclude coverage for such acts as violations of beverage control
statutes or service to minors.226
In the final analysis, social host liability would impose heavy fi-
nancial burdens that might devastate unprotected individuals. 2 7
Considered together with other potential impacts of social host lia-
bility,228 these burdens significantly outweigh the speculative and
probably minimal benefits of a liability rule.229 The burdens that
liability would place on social hosts have convinced many courts
not to impose liability,230 and they have failed to convince other
courts only because those courts erroneously focused their benefit
analyses on the entire drunk driving problem.231 When the benefits
of social host liability are reexamined and properly viewed, the
benefit/burden analysis leaves no doubt about the proper result.
Imposition of a legal duty is not fundamentally fair to social hosts.
Summary of Legal Analysis
Viewed through purely doctrinal notions such as foreseeability
and proximate cause, civil liability for social hosts arguably is justi-
fied for the same reasons as civil liability for tavern owners, al-
though the justifications become weaker as circumstances move
along the continuum from one-to-one contact between host and
guest to huge gatherings involving multiple hosts and hundreds of
guests. As the New Jersey Supreme Court has observed, however,
226. See Special Project, supra note 10, at 1120-21.
227. See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 568, 476 A.2d 1219, 1235 (1984) (Garibaldi, J.,
dissenting).
228. For example, some courts have noted the effect that social host liability might have
on the relationships and environment at social events, although they have not given this
"burden" much weight. See, e.g., Keckonen v. Robles, 146 Ariz. 268, 705 P.2d 945 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1985) (review denied); Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 154, 577 P.2d 669,
675, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534, 540 (1978); Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 m. App. 2d 412,
199 N.E.2d 300 (1964); Harriman v. Smith, 697 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Kelly
v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 554-55, 476 A.2d 1219, 1227 (1984); Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d
100, 103, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548, 552 (1975), afl'd, 55 A.D.2d 597, 389 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1976);
Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259, 275-76, 366 N.W.2d 857, 865 (1985); Olsen v. Copeland,
90 Wis. 2d 483, 491, 280 N.W.2d 178, 181 (1979) (overruled in Sorensen v. Jarvis, 119 Wis.
2d 617, 350 N.W.2d 108 (1984)).
229. See supra notes 208-14 and accompanying text.
230. See, e.g., supra notes 163-72 and accompanying test.
231. See supra notes 208-14 and accompanying text.
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"whether a duty exists is ultimately a question of fairness. ' 23 2
Courts should not impose a duty on purely doctrinal grounds when
that duty cannot pass scrutiny for fundamental fairness.
Social host liability cannot pass any reasonable fairness test.
When the benefits and burdens of liability are examined closely,
the benefits all but disappear. The crushing burdens of liability, on
the other hand, become all too obvious. On fairness grounds alone,
therefore, social host liability should be rejected.
Policy Considerations
Other policy considerations also enter into a court's decision
concerning whether to impose liability on social hosts. Although
these considerations do not relate specifically to the legal question
of whether the duty is fundamentally fair from a benefit/burden
perspective, they do relate in a more general manner to the impact
of liability. As a result, they may have a significant bearing on
whether to adopt the rule. Because of the unusually controversial
nature of the issue, several such general policy factors have arisen
which courts should consider in any decision concerning social host
liability.
Availability of a Remedy to Plaintiffs
Proponents of social host liability often justify their position by
arguing that liability would provide injured plaintiffs with another
source of recovery.233 These advocates argue that, in the absence of
liability, many plaintiffs would lack an effective remedy because
232. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 544, 476 A.2d 1219, 1222 (1984) (quoting Goldberg v.
Housing Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 583, 186 A.2d 291, 293 (1962) (emphasis by the court)).
233. See, e.g., Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 205, 156 A.2d 1, 10 (1959) ("[W]e are
convinced that recognition of the plaintiff's claim will afford a fairer measure of justice to
innocent third parties whose injuries are brought about by the unlawful and negligent sale
of alcoholic beverages to minors and intoxicated persons ... ."); Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis.
2d 259, 272, 366 N.W.2d 857, 863 (1985) ("[The] responsibility [of the drunk driver himself]
will be shared with at least one additional culpable party, the negligent tortfeasor who sup-
plied the liquor.") (quoting Sorensen v. Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627, 643, 350 N.W.2d 108, 116
(1984)); see also Recent Decisions, Social Host May Be Held Liable for the Acts of Intoxi-
cated Guests: Coulter v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 9 Cum L. Rv. 613, 623
(1978) (suggesting that, besides deterrence of drunk driving, the California Supreme Court's
other major rationale for liability in Coulter was "to provide a plaintiff with access to an-
other pocket").
1986] 623
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
the drunken driver was either a minor or a habitual drunkard.34
This "deep pocket" rationale is appealing when applied in a com-
mercial context because commercial entities readily can absorb
costs involved by purchasing insurance and passing on the cost to
customers. 3 5
The deep pocket argument, however, is not convincing in a non-
commercial setting. Whether or not a social host has obtained in-
surance,2, 6 that host cannot spread his costs to other individuals.
The host must absorb the costs alone.237 Although, despite these
problems, injured plaintiffs occasionally could collect large judg-
ments against social hosts when drunken drivers were judgment-
proof, the probable frequency of these situations does not provide
a particularly compelling justification for an extension of civil
liability.238
Government Interest
Another distinction between the policies associated with social
host liability and those associated with tavern owner liability is the
extent of the government's interest in regulating dispensers of al-
coholic beverages. Historically, commercial dispensers have been
subject to stringent regulation and licensing requirements, 239 while
social hosts have not been licensed and have been subject to very
234. See DeMoulin & Whitcomb, supra note 167, at 357.
235. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
236. See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 568, 476 A.2d 1219, 1235 (1984) (Garibaldi, J.,
dissenting); see also supra notes 221-26 and accompanying text (discussing whether afforda-
ble liability insurance would be available to social hosts).
237. See Kelly, 96 N.J. at 568, 476 A.2d at 1234 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting); supra note
220 and accompanying text.
238. See Olsen v. Copeland, 90 Wis. 2d 483, 491, 280 N.W.2d 178, 181 (1979) ("The prob-
lem presented here is not one of the adequate remedies for an injured plaintiff.") (overruled
in Sorenson v. Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627, 350 N.W.2d 108 (1984)); Casenote, supra note 215, at
984 (noting that most social hosts are not owners of apartment complexes such as the de-
fendant in Coulter).
239. See Keckonen v. Robles, 146 Ariz. 268, 270, 705 P.2d 945, 947 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985)
(noting legislative regulation of "virtually every aspect of the manufacture, sale, and distri-
bution of alcoholic beverages" since the repeal of Prohibition) (citing Settlemyer v. Wil-
mington Veteran's Post No. 49, 11 Ohio St. 3d 123, 464 N.E.2d 521 (1984)) (review denied);
Harriman v. Smith, 697 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (noting the governmental
interest in business vendors, but not social hosts, that supports licensing requirements for
vendors); supra note 36 and accompanying text (citing list of applicable statutes in all fifty
states).
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little regulation.24 0 As a result, social host liability does not impli-
cate the same level of government interest as tavern owner liabil-
ity.241 Particularly when plaintiffs have claimed that liability
should lie because of a host's statutory violations, many courts
have decided either that the government's lesser interest in regu-
lating social hosts weighs against liability24 2 or that liability should
await a legislative determination that government involvement is
appropriate.2 43
Moral Blameworthiness
Some courts also have refused to impose liability because they
have viewed the potential liability as significantly greater than the
fault involved.244 Courts that have overturned the common law rule
of nonliability, however, have had little difficulty rejecting this
contention. These courts have emphasized the devastating results
of drunk driving, and have dismissed as unacceptable any moral
values that could ignore such devastation.2
Given the public's heightened concern about drunk driving in re-
cent years,248 moral blameworthiness considerations now probably
weigh in favor of social host liability rather than against it. 24 7 The
public's awareness of the dangers associated with drunk driving,
and the mounting pressure against such behavior, have replaced
older notions that the burdens of liability are not commensurate
with the fault involved. Although the moral blameworthiness
240. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text (noting that, until very recently, the
vast majority of courts had held that state legislatures did not intend to regulate social hosts
when they passed their liquor laws).
241. See Harriman v. Smith, 697 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
242. See id.
243. See Keckonen v. Robles, 146 Ariz. 268, 270, 705 P.2d 945, 947 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985)
(citing Settlemyer v. Wilmington Veteran's Post No. 49, 11 Ohio St. 3d 123, 464 N.E.2d 521
(1984)) (review denied).
244. See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 549, 476 A.2d 1219, 1225 (1984) (pointing out the
use of this argument in the past to reject expanded liability).
245. See Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 153, 577 P.2d 669, 674, 145 Cal. Rptr.
534, 539 (1978); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 549-51, 476 A.2d 1219, 1225 (1984).
246. See supra note 1.
247. Cf. Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259, 267, 366 N.W.2d 857, 861 (1985) ("We con-
clude that [the] fault principle [that an injured party should recover against an individual
who negligently causes injury] is equally applicable to the social host who by negligent fur-
nishing of the alcoholic drink causes the injury.").
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factor alone cannot justify liability, courts should add this factor to
other considerations when they determine whether to extend liabil-
ity to social hosts.
Certainty Versus Flexibility
When courts attempt to fashion a new legal rule, they often
must choose between certainty and flexibility. If a court creates a
rigid rule, unjust results may occur when the new rule is applied to
cases with distinguishable fact patterns. On the other hand, if a
court creates a flexible rule to respond to varying factual situa-
tions, affected individuals may have no clear standards by which to
guide their conduct.24
The first two decisions in which courts extended liability to the
social host demonstrate the problems this difficult choice causes in
social host liability. In Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha
Tau Omega Fraternity,249 the Oregon Supreme Court fashioned a
flexible rule which required the jury to determine whether, under
the particular circumstances of a given case, the social host should
have assumed a duty to control his guests' consumption of alco-
holic beverages.250 In Coulter v. Superior Court,251 on the other
hand, the California Supreme Court fashioned a blanket rule
which imposed a duty on all social hosts who directly serve liquor
to their guests.2 52 Both rules created problems. The Wiener rule
proved too nebulous to apply successfully, while the Coulter rule
often required courts to impose liability when it probably was
248. This notion perhaps was expressed best by Roscoe Pound:
[E]ven the most flexible of mechanisms will operate more or less mechanically,
and it is not easy to make legal machinery flexible and at the same time ade-
quate to the general security. The requirements of particular cases must yield
more or less to the requirements of generality and certainty of legal precepts
and of uniformity and equality in their application. Hence, even though in gen-
eral the law tends to bring about results accordant with the moral sense of the
community, the necessarily mechanical operation of legal rules will in particu-
lar cases produce situations where the legal result and the result demanded by
the moral sense of the community are at least to some extent out of accord.
2 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE § 68, at 267 (1959).
249. 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971).
250. See id. at 639-40, 485 P.2d at 21-22; supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
251. 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
252. See id. at 152-53, 577 P.2d at 673-74, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 538-39; supra notes 131-36
and accompanying text.
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unjustified.253 Possibly because neither the flexible rule nor the
blanket rule worked, the state legislatures in Oregon and California
modified the applicable statutes to abrogate or severely limit the
scope of the new rules.254
The tension between certainty and flexibility has continued in
recent social host liability decisions. The New Jersey court in Kelly
v. Gwinnell,255 the Iowa court in Clark v. Mincks,2 and the Wis-
consin court in Koback v. Crook257 all chose blanket rules analo-
gous to, but not as broad as, the rule in Coulter.25 On the other
hand, the Georgia court in Sutter v. Hutchings259 chose a flexible
rule more closely related to Wiener.260 Because these decisions all
are less than two years old, the new rules in these cases have not
undergone meaningful testing. As a result, the tension between cer-
tainty and flexibility remains. When courts in other jurisdictions
consider social host liability, they will face the same difficult choice
in attempting to fashion a rule that is fair, yet workable.
Availability of Alternative Approaches
Courts debating the wisdom of any proposed legal rule also must
consider the availability of alternative approaches to the problem.
If other effective remedies are available, a court should view the
proposed rule with skepticism. A proposal that presents considera-
ble difficulties and disadvantages, and that is unnecessary because
effective alternatives exist, should not be adopted.
253. See supra note 135. See generally Graham, supra note 135 (comparing the ap-
proaches in Wiener and Coulter).
254. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
255. 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
256. 364 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1985) (en banc).
257. 123 Wis. 2d 259, 366 N.W.2d 857 (1985).
258. See supra notes 64-70, 87-95 & 140-51 and accompanying text.
259. 254 Ga. 194, 327 S.E.2d 716 (1985); see supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
260. The court in Sutter stated that it would submit the issues of foreseeability and prox-
imate cause to a jury for a determination of whether these elements were present-
[A] jury would be authorized to find that it is foreseeable to the provider that
the intoxicated driver may injure someone. That is to say, a jury would be
authorized to find that providing alcohol to a noticeably intoxicated 17-year-
old automobile driver was one of the proximate causes of the negligence of the
driver and of the injuries to the deceased.
Id. at 198, 327 S.E.2d at 719 (footnotes omitted).
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For social host liability, many effective alternative measures are
available. These alternatives could achieve the same purpose as so-
cial host liability-deterrence of drunk driving261-with far more
satisfactory results and with fewer disadvantages. One alternative
already in force, for example, is criminal sanctions against drunk
driving. In recent years, virtually every state has passed laws in-
creasing criminal penalties for drunk driving and has strengthened
enforcement of those laws.2e 2 Unlike social host liability, these new
measures have resulted in an immediate and significant reduction
in the number of accidents involving drunk drivers.6 3 One possible
explanation for the greater success of criminal sanctions is that
they focus directly on drunk drivers rather than on third parties
such as social hosts. Instead of trying to regulate the behavior of
drunken drivers indirectly, criminal sanctions regulate behavior di-
rectly by forcing individuals who drink and drive to accept respon-
sibility for the consequences of their actions.
Other alternatives are available. For example, noncriminal mea-
sures aimed directly at drunk drivers could provide significant de-
terrents. Several such measures are available, including civil forfei-
ture proceedings to confiscate vehicles driven by drunken drivers
in automobile accidents, treatment of such vehicles as "instru-
ments of crime" in these forfeiture proceedings, and provisions re-
quiring all drivers to post bonds that they would forfeit upon con-
viction for drunk driving.264 These measures essentially are
untested but, like criminal sanctions, they may prove more effec-
tive than social host liability in deterring drunk driving because
they affect drunk drivers directly rather than through third
parties.
261. Deterrence of drunk driving has been a major focus of every decision to impose lia-
bility on social hosts. See Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 154, 577 P.2d 669, 675,
145 Cal. Rptr. 534, 540 (1978); Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 197-99, 327 S.E.2d 716,
719-20 (1985); Ashlock v. Norris, 475 N.E.2d 1167, 1169 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Clark v.
Mincks, 364 N.W.2d 226, 230 (Iowa 1985) (en banc); Longstreth v. Gensel, 423 Mich. 675,
377 N.W.2d 804' (1985); Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 121-22 & n.7, 200 N.W.2d 149, 152-53
& n.7 (1972); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 544-45, 476 A.2d 1219, 1222 (1984); Wiener v.
Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 643, 485 P.2d 18, 23
(1971); Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259, 276, 366 N.W.2d 857, 865 (1985).
262. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
264. See Kraft, supra note 4, at 400-09 (outlining these proposed approaches).
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In short, many alternatives to social host liability are available.
These alternatives can deter drunk driving at least as effectively as
social host liability, if not more effectively. They also may not cre-
ate as many burdens and incur as many disadvantages. At the very
least, therefore, courts should not act hastily to impose liability
without first considering whether these other measures are already
mitigating the problem or are likely to mitigate it in the near
future.
Social Pressures
Alternative measures do not have to involve judicial or legisla-
tive constraints. For example, social pressures may act to abate a
problem, making further measures unnecessary. Because these
pressures arise from a societal consensus concerning appropriate
conduct, they are likely to operate with far less resistance than
courts would encounter when they seek to enforce a norm through
judicial sanctions.
With respect to the problems associated with drinking at social
gatherings, social pressures clearly have begun to operate. In the
past, social hosts were motivated by friendship to serve as many
drinks as a guest requested, despite any concern for the guest's
well-being. Hosts were under social pressure to refrain from being
"big brothers." Because of the mounting awareness of drunk driv-
ing tragedies, however, social hosts now are likely to ignore these
fears. Increasingly, hosts are acting consistently with their personal
concerns for guests, and are refusing to serve additional drinks.26 5
The presence of these social pressures is an important distinc-
tion between social host liability and tavern owner liability. These
pressures generally do not operate in the commercial context
265. The Wisconsin Supreme Court noted this phenomenon in Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis.
2d 259, 366 N.W.2d 857 (1985):
"We are still our brothers keepers, and it would be a rare host at a social gath-
ering who would knowingly give more liquor to an intoxicated friend when he
knows his invitee must take care of himself on the highway and will potentially
endanger other persons. Social justice and common sense require the social
host to see within reason that his guests do not partake too much of his
generosity."
Id. at 271, 366 N.W.2d at 862 (quoting Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 740, 176 N.W.2d
566, 573-74 (1970) (Hallows, C.J., dissenting)).
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because tavern owners and operators usually lack social hosts'
friendship concerns. Although tavern owners may have a sense of
social responsibility, they also have a strong financial incentive to
serve their patrons because of the profits they make from serving
drinks.66
Social pressures clearly are not, by themselves, an adequate re-
sponse to drunk driving after social events. Coupled with alterna-
tive legal measures, however, they represent an effective response
to this problem that does not present the same disadvantages as
social host liability. Courts should consider this response, which
was not available to address problems connected with commercial
dispensers, as an important reason not to extend liability beyond
tavern owners to social hosts.
Deference to the Legislature
Social host liability cases present the difficult and sensitive task
of sorting out many competing policy considerations. The heavy
political pressures created by increasing public awareness and ac-
tivism have exacerbated these difficulties. Although courts cer-
tainly have the authority to expand civil liability to social hosts,267
many courts have decided not to exercise that authority.
In light of the complicated issues and the increasing social and
political pressures, many courts have decided that any extension of
liability should come from the legislative branch.68 According to
these courts, legislatures are better equipped to investigate, ex-
amine, and debate the relative merits of conflicting policy
266. See Harriman v. Smith, 697 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
267. See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 555-56, 476 A.2d 1219, 1228 (1984).
268. See, e.g., Keckonen v. Robles, 146 Ariz. 268, 270, 705 P.2d 945, 947 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1985) (review denied); Miller v. Moran, 96 Ill. App. 3d 596, 600-01, 421 N.E.2d 1046, 1048-49
(1981); Boutwell v. Sullivan, 469 So. 2d 526, 529 (Miss. 1985); Harriman v. Smith, 697
S.W.2d 219, 221-22 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 104, 375 N.Y.S.2d
548, 552 (1975), aff'd, 55 A.D.2d 597, 389 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1976); Holmes v Circo, 196 Neb.
496, 505, 244 N.W.2d 65, 70 (1976); Garren v. Cummings & McCurdy, Inc., No. 0727, slip op.
at - (S.C. Ct. App. June 9, 1986); Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash. 2d 434, 441-42, 656 P.2d
1030, 1034 (1982) (en banc). A number of judges dissenting to decisions to impose liability
also have urged deference to legislative judgments. See, e.g., Clark v. Mincks, 364 N.W.2d
226, 232-34 (Iowa 1985) (en banc) (McGiverin, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part);
Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 568-69, 476 A.2d 1219, 1235 (1984) (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
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considerations. 26 The need for deference is particularly compelling
in the context of social host liability, these courts also note, be-
cause of the lack of legislative guidelines for courts to use in fash-
ioning standards for liability, a lack which is mainly due to the
government's traditional nonregulation of social hosts' conduct.70
Summary of Policy Considerations
General policy considerations relevant to social host liability,
like the legal arguments, do not favor an expansion of civil liabil-
ity. Although moral blameworthiness does weigh in favor of ex-
tending liability, the traditional "deep pocket" justification for lia-
bility is considerably less compelling when applied to social hosts
than when applied to tavern owners. Other policy considerations,
including the relevant government interest, the difficulty of fash-
ioning a rule flexible enough to avoid unjust results but certain
enough to provide a workable standard, the availability of alterna-
tive measures, the social pressures at work, and the need for legis-
lative deference, all weigh against an extension of liability. To-
gether with the legal arguments, these considerations present a
compelling case against social host liability.
CONCLUSION
In their fervor to prevent drunk driving, courts should not rush
to impose civil liability on social hosts without carefully consider-
ing the merits and the drawbacks of such a decision. Rhetoric
about the evils of driving while intoxicated, without more, does not
justify a departure from the common law rule that only the drunk
driver, and not the host who served him, is liable for injuries stem-
ming from alcohol-related accidents. Courts should weigh the legal
arguments and the underlying policy considerations painstakingly
before they rush to change this established doctrine.
269. See Harriman v. Smith, 697 S.W.2d 219, 221-22 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Holmes v.
Circo, 196 Neb. 496, 505, 244 N.W.2d 65, 70 (1976); Garren v. Cummings & McCurdy, Inc.,
No. 0727, slip op. at - (S.C. Ct. App. June 9, 1986); Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash. 2d 434,
441, 656 P.2d 1030, 1034 (1982) (en banc).
270. See Keckonen v. Robles, 146 Ariz. 268, 270, 705 P.2d 945, 947 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985)
(citing Settlemyer v. Wilmington Veteran's Post No. 49, 11 Ohio St. 3d 123, 464 N.E.2d 521
(1984)) (review denied); see also supra note 240 and accompanying text (noting traditional
government stance of not regulating social hosts).
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Although foreseeability and proximate cause arguments might
justify an extension of liability to social hosts in certain situations,
just as they have for tavern owners, the decision to impose liability
ultimately must rest on whether the duty to act is fundamentally
fair. Social host liability cannot pass any reasonable fairness test.
The possible benefits of liability in deterring drunken driving are
highly speculative at best. In fact, past experience indicates that
the impact on drunk driving would be minimal. In contrast, social
host liability would create identifiable and significant burdens. So-
cial hosts would face prohibitive costs in attempting to avoid liabil-
ity or in attempting to insure against it. Together with the general
policy considerations, these minimal benefits and heavy burdens
present a compelling case against any extension of liability. Instead
of responding emotionally to understandable concerns about drunk
driving, courts should take a closer look at these benefits and bur-
dens, and should conclude that social host liability is a bad idea.
DERRY D. SPARLIN, JR.
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